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DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN TAXES AND
TAKINGS: THE CONTINUOUS BURDENS
PRJNCIPLE, AND ITS BROADER APPLICATION
Eric Kades•

I. INTRODUCTION

When government taxes, it takes citizens' property, usually money, to
fund various projects. The Takings Clause 1 declares that the government
must pay compensation when it takes private property. Requiring compensation for taxation would immediately bankrupt the state, as the state would
have to return immediately all tax receipts to meet this compensation duty.
This simple argument shows that the Takings Clause cannot reach all taxes.
This Article addresses one fundamental question: What forms of taxation,
if any, constitute a "taking" and require compensation? To illustrate this
question, consider the example posed by Calvin Massey: "Surely an income tax of 100% imposed on a single individual-for example, Bill
Gates-would violate the Takings Clause. If that is so, then the problem
becomes a matter of degree." 2 This example does not present a novel dilemma. An early critic of the income tax feared ever-increasing exemptions
and marginal rates would concentrate the burden of income taxation on the
wealthy few:
"If you approve this law, with this iniquitous exemption of $4,000, and this
communistic march goes on and five years hence a statute comes to you with
an exemption of $20,000 and a tax of 20 percent ... how can you meet it in
view of the decision which my opponents ask you now to render [upholding
the income tax]?" 3

The "communistic march" of exempting ever-greater incomes and subject-

• B.A., Yale College, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1994. Thanks to Lynda Butler, Bob Ellickson,
Jim Krier, Glynn Lunney, Tom Merril, Ron Rosenberg, and participants at a Tulane Law School faculty
workshop for helpful comments and suggestions.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
2
Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 104
(1996). We will call this example the "Bill Gates Tax."
3

ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 152 (1993) (quoting Joseph Choate, prominent opponent of progressive
income tax in late 1800s).
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ing the wealthy still taxed to ever-greater tax rates becomes our Bill Gates
Tax.
A tax singling out one or a handful of citizens offends the constitutional principle the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked: the Takings
Clause is designed "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."4 Thus, the notion that taxes are never takings is inconsistent with foundational takings law; the label "tax" confers no immunity to the principles of the Takings Clause.
Richard Epstein employs this insight with a vengeance. Under his
fully articulated theory, the Takings Clause invalidates not just esoteric hypotheticals like the Bill Gates tax, but deems unconstitutional the income
tax code's long-standing progressive rate structure. 5 Higher rates on higher
incomes, Epstein maintains, take the property of top earners to a disproportionate degree. According to Epstein, only strictly proportional rates (i.e., a
"flat" tax) satisfy the demands of the Takings Clause. 6
Epstein's position is inconsistent with long-standing taxation practices
in the United States. Yet, it is perhaps no more extreme than the view undermined above, that taxes are never takings. Numerous critics have attacked Epstein's position. 7 No one, however, has offered a coherent theory
of the relationship between taxes and takings; instead, one fits reality by
simultaneously holding the "Bill Gate Tax" invalid but progressive income
taxation and other common taxes valid.
This Article proposes a novel rule to draw the line between permissible
taxes and those that violate the Takings Clause: the Continuous Burden
Principle (CBP). To satisfy the CBP, a tax must impose burdens such that

4

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). A tax on ''named individuals or [on] easily ascertainable members of a group" might be unconstitutional on grounds entirely unrelated to the Takings
Clause, as a bill of attainder, if it imposed ''punishment." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946) (discussing the Bill of Attainder Clauses, U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from passing bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § I 0, cl. I (barring state legislatures from passing bills of attainder)). The Supreme Court has stated that "confiscation of property" is a form of punishment for purposes of
the rule against bills of attainder. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,474 (1977). This Article
does not further consider the possibility that taxation of one person or a small, identifiable group might
amount to a bill of attainder. Note that many of the taxes that will be discussed do not identify individuals
by name, or do not impact an "easily ascertainable" group of persons, and so would not implicate the bill of
attainder clauses in any event.
5
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 297300 (1985).
6
Progressive income taxation is not the only commonly used tax Epstein finds inconsistent with the
Takings Clause. His logic also implies that the widespread use of a property tax to fund education is a taking. See discussion infra Part V.
7
See. e.g., Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 223 (1986); William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1774 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv.
21 (1986).
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there are no large jumps--discontinuities, in an imprecise sense-between
the burden imposed on any taxpayer and the next-most-burdened taxpayer. 8
The Article then generalizes the CBP and argues that it applies not just to
all forms of taxation but to assessments, fees, zoning, the draft, pension obligations, and other forms of regulation that may amount to a taking. The
CBP at its core is a novel definition of what it means for one or a few property owners to be "singled out" for an unfair share of public burdens, which
is the most frequently recited justification for the Takings Clause.
Before presenting the CBP and its applications in Part IV, Parts II
and III of this Article summarize existing commentary on the line between
taxes and takings, show that there are no fundamental tensions between
tax policy and takings policy, and consider the arguments of Epstein and
others on the constitutionality of progressive income taxation. Part IV
fully presents the CBP. Part V then considers the CBP's application to
taxes and assessments where, unlike general revenue taxes, beneficiaries
are easily identifiable. Finally, Part VI considers the difficult question of
what group of measures should be "packaged" together for takings
analysis.
II. EXISTING COMMENTARY DISTINGUISHING TAXES FROM TAKINGS

Perhaps the most surprising observation about recent commentary on
drawing the line between taxation and takings is its paucity. This is surprising since the issue is so fundamental. The few scholars addressing the issue
often stress the difficulty in demarcation. For instance, Walter Blum and
Harry Kalven state that the difference between taxation and takingsconfiscation "is more troublesome to isolate than one would expect. If the
element of coercion makes it easy to distinguish taxation from charity, the
same element makes it awkward to distinguish the coercion of taxation
from confiscation."9 In other words, Blum and Kalven find no guidance in
a Constitution that simultaneously confers the power of taxation yet also
contains the Takings Clause. Massey, writing on the constitutionality of
8
We put to one side certain taxes that cannot violate the Takings Clause. Taxes used to discourage behavior that amounts to a nuisance are not takings; the Supreme Court has long declared and has recently
affirmed that the government may completely ban such uses of property. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 410 (1915) (to extent brickwork constituted nuisance, locality could forbid use without owing compensation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992) (discussing power to regulate
"harmful or noxious uses"); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 285. Similarly, the government may discourage, through taxation, other behavior that is illegal, such as antitnJst violations. Note that taxes on nuisances and antitnJst violators impose relatively narrow burdens and so, without this exception, might
qualify as compensable takings. If, however, the government has the power to eliminate an activity or regulate it extensively without paying compensation, it may use taxation as a regulatory tool. Deciding exactly
what the government may regulate without paying compensation is a difficult question at the core of takings
law; the simple point here is that if regulation is not a taking in a given context, then neither is a tax designed to achieve the same ends.
9
WALTERJ. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE ANATOMY OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION 4 (Univ. of Chicago Law School, Occasional Papers, 1973).
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progressive income taxation, likewise describes the "none-too-clear boundary between taxation and taking." 1 Few scholars have heeded Saul
Levmore's exhortation that "every theory of takings should explain or at
least struggle with the question of why the power to tax-without compensation, of course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional
obligation to compensate condemnees." 11
At times, judges and legal commentators have declared that Congress'
power to tax is beyond constitutional review. Almost two hundred years
ago, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall famously declared that "[t]he only
security against the abuse of [taxation] is found in the structure of the government itself. " 12 The implication of Marshall's declaration is clear: those
dissatisfied with a tax should elect representatives who will repeal the levy.
Thomas Cooley, a leading jurist and scholar, echoed Chief Justice Marshall
a hundred years later: "[T]he power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in
force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it." 13
Yet, this is the same Cooley cited at the beginning of this section for
the conflicting proposition that a tax can amount to confiscation (a taking),
in which case an injured property owner has a judicial remedy in addition to
any political options. As shown in subpart II.B, the quotations in the previous paragraph do not accurately reflect the "classical" nineteenth-century
view of the line between taxes and takings. Far from holding taxation immune to the Takings Clause, and thus denying the need to draw a line between the two, case law repeatedly held that "unfairly apportioned" taxation
could violate the Takings Clause.
Before discussing this relatively sophisticated classical doctrine, which
could determine when taxation shaded over into takings, this Article first
discusses a much simpler rule: any measure that imposes a general obligation to make a payment is a tax, while a measure stripping an owner of a
specific asset is a taking. Strangely, both the modem Supreme Court and
many scholars have embraced this highly formal rule. The classical view,
focusing much more on the substance of a tax instead of its form, arose
during an era commonly perceived as a period of excessively formal legal
analysis.

°

10

Massey, supra note 2, at 86.
Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285, 292 (1990). Levmore
suggests that expenditures from tax revenues must provide roughly commensurate reciprocal benefits in
order to avoid a takings claim. !d.
12
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,428 (1819).
13 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 82 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 479,
487-88, 494 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890)).
11

192

HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 192 2002-2003

97:189 (2002)

Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings

A. A Simple Solution: Taxations General Liabilities
Versus Takings Specific Assets
The idea that taxes and takings can be distinguished, by defining taxes
as general obligations and takings as deprivations of specific assets, is of
very recent origin. Blum and Kalven apparently were the first to consider
this distinction. 14 They realized the problems inherent in such a formal distinction:
But [this rule] may on occasion fail to keep taxation and confiscation clearly
apart. Taxes can be set so high that the taxpayer is forced to dispose of specific property or simply turn it over to government in order to satisfy his tax
obligation. This perception is at the core of the notion of confiscatory taxation. Indeed, revolutionary regimes have sometimes used the format of 100
percent taxation as the very vehicle of confiscation. 15

Despite this manifest conceptual wealrness, and the lack of any precedent even suggesting this view, it appears that the Supreme Court recently
embraced the type of distinction proposed by Blum and Kalven.
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 16 the Court struck down a statute imposing between $50 million and $100 million of retroactive liability for
workers' health problems on a corporation that exited the coal business
decades before Congress enacted the statute imposing the liability. The
Justices' voting pattern in Eastern Enterprises was messy. O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, argued that the statute worked as a taking. Kennedy, concurring with the result, refused to invoke the Takings Clause
because the statute "does not operate upon or alter an identified property
interest. The law simply imposes an obligation." 17 Kennedy expanded on
this theme at length and concluded that the Supreme Court had always
"been careful not to lose sight of the importance of identifying the property
allegedly taken." 18 Kennedy, nonetheless, voted to hold the statute unconstitutional because he believed that such extraordinary retroactivity violated
the substantive dimension of the Due Process Clause.
Breyer, in dissent with three other Justices, agreed with Kennedy that
the Takings Clause applied only to "specific interests in physical or intellectual property," as distinguished from the statute at issue in the case, which
"involve[d] not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an ordinary liability to pay money." 19 Breyer agreed with Kennedy that the proper
doctrine to apply was substantive due process, but argued that the statute
14

BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that the difference between taxation and takings
"appears to reside essentially in the difference between taking money and taking specific property").
15
!d. at 5.
16
524 u.s. 498 (1998).
17
!d. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
18
/d.at543 .
19
/d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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satisfied that test. Moreover, he strongly implied that taxes can never be
takings: "If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to
pay B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay
the government, i.e. when it assesses a tax." 20
Other than O'Connor's plurality opinion that applied the Takings
Clause, the only "majority vote" to emerge was the combination of Kennedy (concurring) and Breyer (dissenting, with three others) for the proposition that the Takings Clause applies only to deprivations of "identified
property interests," or to "specific interests in physical or intellectual property. "21
Neither Kennedy nor Breyer offered any precedent or argument for this
distinction. As Thomas Merrill notes, "[t]he Breyer/Kennedy argument as
to why no takings property was implicated by the Coal Act [in Eastern Enterprises] was a novel one, in the sense that neither Justice was able to cite
any legal authority in support of his thesis." 22 The only policy justification
that Kennedy offered was, in effect, that takings doctrine is in such disarray
that we need to limit its applicability as much as possible. 23 This justification is unconvincing, especially given that substantive due process is no
model of doctrinal clarity. Breyer seemingly acknowledged the form-oversubstance nature of his grounds for distinguishing taxation from takings; he
admitted that, economically, the statute in Eastern Enterprises is no different from taking specific plants and equipment worth $50 million to $100
million. 24
Form over substance is not the worst problem with the Breyer dissent.
He goes on to quarrel with Justice O'Connor about the "character of the
government action" arm of the Takings Clause test from Penn Central. 25 In
other words, Breyer's dissent demonstrates profound doctrinal confusion.
If Breyer really believed that the Takings Clause did not apply to the facts
of Eastern Enterprises, he should have chided O'Connor for invoking a
Takings test instead of a substantive due process test.
In the end, the distinction may not matter, as the substantive due process test articulated by Kennedy and Breyer apparently differs little from the
Penn Central Takings Clause test applied by O'Connor. The Court noted in
20
!d. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As discussed infra Part 11.8, Breyer ignores a long line of cases
that have held that taxes may amount to takings.
21
!d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22
Thomas W. Menill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 903 (2000).
MetTill, nonetheless, says that "the argument was presented as an inductive generalization drawn from the
holdings of the Court's takings cases, and in this sense was not radical." /d.
23
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541-42. Of course, the same might well be said about substantive due process, and takings at least has the advantage of beginning the analysis under a label that is not an oxymoron.
24

!d. at 529.

25

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (articulating the following
three part test in deciding takings claims: (i) economic impact on claimant; (ii) extent to which regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the governmental action).
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previous pension cases, in which it applied the Takings Clause, that results
were likely to be the same under either theory. 26 It is not surprising, then, in
Eastern that Justice O'Connor claimed that both her plurality's Takings
Clause analysis and the concurring and dissenting opinions' substantive
Due Process Clause analysis drew on common principles. 27 Even more telling, Kennedy cited O'Connor's analysis as a convincing means to reach his
conclusion: "The plurality opinion demonstrates in convincing fashion that
the remedy created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the interests which the Government asserts in support of the statute. " 28 The "demonstration" Kennedy cited with approval is O'Connor's application of the
Penn Central takings test. Similarly, Justice Breyer directly applied the
same Takings test in his dissent and then stated that substantive due process
analysis is similar and merely "put[s] the matter more directly."29 In the
end, then, the substantive due process analysis applied by Kennedy, in concurrence, and Breyer, in dissent, is simply a thinly veiled reworking of takings law.
The greatest strength of O 'Connor's plurality opinion is that she fit the
facts of the case under the primary purpose of the Takings Clauseavoiding unfair allocation of the burdens of public projects. 30
"[T]he Constitution does not permit a solution to the problem of funding miners' benefits that imposes such a disproportionate and severely retroactive burden upon Eastern." While we do not question Congress' power to address that
problem, the solution it crafted improperly places a severe, disproportionate,
and extremely retroactive burden on EastemY

The legislature should not be able to defeat the primary substantive purpose
of the Takings Clause, avoiding "disproportionate" burdens, by the formality of assessing a general liability instead of taking a specific asset.
In a thorough and careful effort to arrange the Supreme Court's exist26
In Connolly, the Court declared that it was not surprising that a Takings claim failed where an earlier
(substantive) due process claim had failed . Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
There is similar language in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (quoting Connolly). As O'Connor makes clear, the definitional distinction
between takings and substantive due process is not based on remedy: although takings claims usually request damages ('just compensation'') and substantive due process claims usually request injunctive relief,
the Court has held that takings plaintiffs may request injunctive and declaratory relief. E. Enters., 524 U.S.
at 521 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group , Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.I5 (1978)). Breyer
apparently overlooked this passage in his dissent when he rhetorically asked, "could a court apply the same
kind of Takings Clause analysis when violation means the law's invalidation, rather than simply the payment of compensation?" /d. at 556.
27
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529.
28
/d. at 549.
29
/d. at 567.
30
See infra Part Il.C (demonstrating that avoiding unfair burden allocation lies at the core of the Supreme Court's substantive analysis of takings claims).
31
£ . Enters., 524 U.S. at 536-38.
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ing body of constitutional property precedents-takings, substantive due
process, and procedural due process-into some sort of coherent structure,
Merrill is constrained to adhere to the holding of Apfel, despite this substantive ground for applying the Takings Clause. He found that the Supreme
Court limits the Takings Clause to "discrete assets," which he defined as
follows:
[A] valued resource that ( 1) is held by the claimant in a legally recognized
property (for example, a fee simple, a lease, an easement, and so forth), and (2)
is created, exchanged or enforced by economic actors with enough frequency
to be recognized as a distinct asset in the relevant community. 32

It is beyond the purpose of Merrill's article to offer any normative justification for the general-liability-specific-asset distinction. He did seem to
find some merit, however, in a discrete-asset test, because it "would also
eliminate the possibility of using the Takings Clause as an instrument for
litigating issues of general distributive justice. "33 He found that this feature
has the benefit of at least confining "the Takings Clause to its traditional
orbit."34 According to Merrill, "The implicit understanding has always
been that the Takings Clause has no application to legislation that imposes
taxes or allocates government spending."35 Although Merrill's concept may
square with more recent understandings of the Takings Clause, this is not
the case as a matter of older tradition. As subpart II.B demonstrates, nineteenth-century courts and commentators repeatedly found that some taxes
did, in fact, amount to takings.
To date, only Blum and Kalven, the originators of the idea that taxation differed from takings by imposing a general liability, have offered
any sort of policy justifications for such a distinction: "Perhaps ... the
taking of specific property by the state is more intrusive than the creation of obligations to be satisfied in money ... perhaps it is suspected
that the taking of property will be not systematic or disciplined by prin32
Menill, supra note 22, at 974. Merrill says the discrete asset requirement is closely bound up with
the tight to exclude: "The discrete asset requirement tells us what it is the owner has a right to exclude others from ." !d. at 975. In forming a doctrinal scheme that squares with scattershot Supreme Court precedents, he is then forced to maintain that a bank account is discrete property. !d. He must do so in order to
avoid contradicting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding state
retention of interest on litigants' funds held in escrow a taking), and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 1925 (1998) (holding use of interest from pooled small client trust accounts to fund legal services for poor a taking). This highlights just how formal a system the Supreme Court has created, if
Eastern Enterprises truly limits the Takings Clause to deprivations of specific assets. It is a taking to expropriate a specific bank account, but not to impose a tax for precisely the amount in the account As
argued in the main text, the latter may amount to a substantive due process violation for which the legal
standard appears to be very similar to the takings test. Thus, in the end, one has a distinction without a
difference.
33
Merrill, supra note 22, at 980.
34 !d.
35

/d. 980-81.
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ciple." 36 However, Blum and Kalven's repeated use of "perhaps" communicates, at best, a half-hearted belief in the proffered merits of the
distinction.
The almost complete absence of a normative justification makes it
difficult to plumb the attractiveness of the general-liability-discreteasset distinction. Perhaps the appeal stems from a mistaken analogy to a
seemingly less controversial principle: that it is pointless for the government to take money by condemnation, because the Takings Clause
requires its immediate return. Yet, even this simple statement requires
qualification, as there are two ways to make sense of a taking of money.
First, as Cooley noted, "[t]aking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compensated in money afterwards, could be nothing more or less than a forced loan." 37 In such a case, the government
exploits the time required for the money's owner to seek compensation.
The few authorities on point agree that such forced loans are
only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the
credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available. It
is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of overruling necessity, which for the time being sets aside all the rules and protections of private right, shall then prescribe. 38

Given the government's undeniable power to define what assets constitute legal tender, 39 however, there is a second way in which the government
can take money without delaying "compensation." Specifically, the government can:
(i) declare government bonds (of any term, e.g., principal due in one
year, ten years, thirty years, or even perpetual obligations) to be legal
tender,
(ii) condemn someone's money, and
(iii) pay them with government bonds.

36

BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at 4-5.
Cooley, supra note 13, at ch. XV, at 759 n.2.
38
/d. at 759; see also Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,424 (1851 )("The exigencies of a state
government can seldom require the taking of money by virtue of this power even in time of war, and never
in time of peace.").
39
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 5 (declaring that Congress shall have the power "To coin Money, regulate
the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin"). The key cases affirming the plenary nature of this power are (i)
The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (upholding Congress's power to declare that treasury notes shall be legal tender, even for debts predating the law making said notes legal tender); (ii) Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding power of Congress to abrogate clauses in
private contracts requiring payment in gold); and (iii) Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding,
somewhat confusingly, that although it was unconstitutional for the U.S. to repudiate a public promise to
pay in gold, bond owners suffered no damages as they received the face amount of the bond in current legal
tender).
37
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Circulating as money, such bonds would likely trade at a discount to
their face value (i.e., with the principal due at end of term) as the interest
rate would be below market rates; otherwise, the government would have
borrowed through the market for less. In practice, this may well not matter.
Outside of those dire emergencies when authority suggests that the government may force loans without the redefinition of legal tender, it seems
likely that voluntary transactions (e.g., selling bonds to the highest bidder)
will be transactionally and administratively cheaper than forced sales under
the condemnation power.
Absent extraordinary circumstances that might induce the government
to resort to forced loans or use of the legal tender power, however, it seems
that the government has little incentive to take money under its condemnation power. It is possible that in Eastern Enterprises Kennedy and Breyer
thought that this lack of any incentive to take money stood for the much
broader principle that "it is impossible to condemn money." There is no
linkage between the futility of condemning money and the definition of a
taking. The disincentives to taking money tells us nothing about what
forms of taxation, if any, run afoul of the Takings Clause.
B. More Nuanced Classical Vzews
In contrast with the formalism of Eastern Enterprises, commentary
from what I call the "classical" era, the late 1800s and early 1900s, confronted the substantive similarity between taxes and takings.
Everything that may be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a
tax; and it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the government,
when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove, instead of a tax, to be an
unlawful confiscation of property, unwarranted by any principle of constitutional government. 40

This willingness to "carefully scrutinize" measures regardless of the
categorical label used by the legislature stands in sharp contrast with Eastern Enterprises, which distinguishes taxation and takings based on the formal notion of fungibility. When the government requires citizens to part
with fungible assets by imposing a general liability and taking money, it is
taxation according to Eastern Enterprises. When the government requires a
specific, nonfungible asset, however, it is deemed a taking.
The "classical" nineteenth-century authority presented in this subsection, however, focuses on a different dimension: the relative size of the
group from whom the government extracts wealth. The following table
summarizes the interaction of this classical dimension with the Eastern Enterprises dimension.

°

4 COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch.l4, at697.
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TABLE!

Cash/General
Liability
(ultimate in
fungibility)
Few Owners'
Property Taken
(as% of
population)
Many Owners'
Property Taken
(as% of
pop_ulatlonl

Monopoly Asset
(ultimate in nonfungibility)

Bill Gates Tax,
Approaching
Taking
Archetypal Tax

Archetypal Taking

l,>*i
I<<

Taxes usually fall on a relatively large portion of the population, and
usually require payment in fungible money. This is why the table uses the label "archetypal tax" in the lower left cell. The archetypal taking is the condemnation of a single piece of land, hence the label in the upper right cell.
Both the fungibility standard from Eastern Enterprises and the relative
group size of the classical standard correctly classify the archetypal cases.
They diverge, however, in their classification of (i) a tax impacting a small
group of citizens (the upper left cell) and (ii) the condemnation of nonfungible assets of a large portion of the citizenry (the lower right cell). This
last category, however, is largely empty: it is hard to imagine the government condemning nonfungible assets en masse. Even in a large land assembly project, such as the construction of a major highway, the
government uses the land of a very small percentage of the population. The
only exception appears to arise from the per se rule that permanent physical
invasions are always takings. Thus, in Loretto v. Manhattan CATV Corp.,
the Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance barring landlords from
interfering with the installation and maintenance of cable TV wiring and
junction boxes on their properties amounted to a taking. 41 Given that the
just compensation ultimately awarded in Loretto was trivial,42 and given
that compensation will likely be trivial in similar cases, courts and commentators can ignore the lower right cell.
41

458 U.S. 419 (1982).
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals ratified the state legislature's determination that just
compensation for suffering the presence of cable TV wiring and appliances amounted to a token $1.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1983).
42
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They cannot ignore the upper right cell, however, for it is easy to conceive of general liabilities that impact a narrow band of the population.
This Article discussed some dramatic hypothetical examples in the Introduction, such as the Bill Gates tax, and will examine some actual examples
in Parts ill, IV, and V. It is here that the fungibility and the "size of group"
criteria part ways. The classic view suggests that, at some point, a narrowly
focused tax becomes a taking; however, the discrete-asset model does not
apply the Takings Clause to such a general liability.
The remaining portion of Part II, along with Parts III and IV, argues
that the classical test is normatively preferable. After laying out the classical position, I argue that such a position is much more congruent with both
judicial and academic statements about the purpose of the Takings Clause.
I then demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between the purposes of
taxation and takings. The Continuous Burdens Principle (CBP) presented
in Part IV can be understood as refining the crude many/few distinction of
the classical model.

1. Classical Theories Treated Takings and Taxation as Structurally
Similar.-Far from seeing taxation and takings as polar opposites, nineteenth-century judges and commentators repeatedly noted their similarities.
One antebellum judge honestly admitted "that it is by no means easy to trace
the dividing line between the two kinds of taking private property,"43 and
went on to observe that "the two appear in principle to be somewhat blended.
Both are exercises of the sovereign power over individual property, and in
both cases the individual is presumed to receive or does in fact receive some
equivalent for the contribution."44 A contemporary concurred:
The right of taxation and the right of eminent domain rest substantially on the
same foundation. Compensation is made when private property is taken in either way. Money is property. Taxation takes it for public use; and the taxpayer receives, or is supposed to receive his just compensation in the
protection which government affords to his life, liberty and property, and in
the increase of the value of his possessions by the use to which the government
applies the money raised by the tax. When private property is taken by right of
eminent domain, special compensation is made. 45

The principle articulated is straightforward. Government uses both
taxation and condemnation to provide public goods. Both cases, under this
classical view, involve a promise of recompense, in one form or another.
For condemnation, the promise is explicit, as represented by the just compensation requirement. For taxation, the promise is implicit: the government will spend tax revenues on projects benefiting most if not all citizens,
43
44

People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209,214 (N.Y. Ch. 1849).
!d.

45

Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,422 (1851) (upholding special assessment for roads, with
assessments based on frontage).
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especially regarding the protection oflife, liberty, and property.
A postbellum court extended this analysis to include special assessments, under which a government charges landowners who particularly benefit by some project, such as a widening of a road, for the costs of that project:
The government may appropriate the property of the individual, when necessary, in one of three ways: First, by taking in the mode prescribed after paying
the owner for it; second, by estimating the benefits to the owner's property
from the improvements to be made, and taking the amount estimated in
money; third, by taking the property in the form of money by the methods of
taxation for which the benefits of protection and other advantages are furnished by the government. The same principle underlies all these methods.
When the property is taken under the right of eminent domain, the public pays
the owner in money; when money is exacted by means of a special assessment,
the owners are compensated in special benefits to their property by public improvements made in its expenditure; and when money is exacted by a general
tax the payer is compensated in the benefits received from the government in
any and all of the ways that a government may benefit society. 46
The court made it quite clear that a "deeper principle" required a court
to ensure that those paying taxes and assessments received some form of
compensation:
[The unifying] principle requires compensation in all cases, whether real estate, money, or any other kind of property is involved; whether it is taken by
the methods adopted under the right of eminent domain, or under the right of
taxation, or by any other means. The principle lies deeper than mere forms or
methods. It wotild be unreasonable to say that the authors of the [Takings
Clause] intended to forbid the taking under one right without just compensation, and intended to allow such appropriation under another right; that they intentionally closed one gap, but intentionally left another down by which the
same wrong, in effect, could be accomplished. 47
Here, the court focuses on substance over form, in stark contrast to the
Eastern Enterprises principle. It reads the Takings Clause to bar uncompensated contributions regardless of the formal mechanism by which the
government separates owners from their property.
Cooley, in a leading treatise on constitutional law, summed up the classical view that taxation and takings differ in degree, not in kind:
Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the same foundation, as
each implies the taking of private property for public use on compensation made;
but the compensation is different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for
the public use, the taxpayer receives, or is supposed to receive, his just compensation in the protection which government affords to life, liberty, and property, in the
public conveniences which it provides, and in the increase in the value of posses-

46
47

People v. Daniels, 22 P. 159, 162 (Utah 1889).
!d. at 163.
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sions which comes from the use to which the government applies the money raised
by the tax; and these benefits amply support the individual burden. 48

Richard Epstein's reading of the Takings Clause is in some respects
(though not all, as we shall see shortly) a modem-day revival of the classical view Cooley articulated. Epstein argues, "[T]he differences between
[taxation and takings] all go to matters of detail and technique, rather than
to basic principle ... both may be used as instruments of confiscation."49
He rejects "rigid schemes of classification" designed to blunt the compensation requirement," maintaining that "[t]axes and regulation are forms of taking, to be examined under principles applicable to all other takings." 50

2. Classical Grounds To Distinguish Takings from Taxation: The
Breadth of the Burdens Jmposed.-Despite the fundamental similarity between taxation and takings, it is essential to establish a principle to distinguish
them. As intimated in the beginning of this Article, if every tax is considered
a taking, then the courts would be buried in taxpayer takings suits-unless the
government can show that the taxpayer received some roughly equivalent
benefit. The classical grounds for the distinction was simple: "Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by
some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an individual, and without regard to the amount, or value exacted
from any other individual, or class of individuals."51 Taxes fall on a broad
swath of the community, with "some rule of apportionment"; takings are burdens concentrated on one or a few citizens owning assets needed for some
public project. In his treatise, Justice Cooley restated this rule:
When the state has need of the property of citizens for its sovereign pwposes, it
may lawfully appropriate it against the will of the owner either under the power to
tax or the right of eminent domain. There is a difference in the two cases which is
vital. When property is appropriated under the right ofeminent domain, a particular item or parcel is taken, because for public purposes there is a special need ofit,
and the state takes it under proceedings which amount, so far as the owner is concerned, to a forced sale. But taxation is based upon the idea of calling upon the
people for equal and proportional contributions to the public wants, that the burdens ofgovt. may fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear them. 52

48

COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 715-16. Cooley offers a striking explanation for why it is
preferable that governments rely on taxation, as opposed to uncompensated takings of whatever goods it
required, to finance their operations: "no arbitrary government without regular and steady taxation
could be anything but an oppressive and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation
would be a forced extortion of the needs of government from such persons or objects as the men in
power might select as victims." !d. at 678.
49
Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, & Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433,434 (1982).
50
!d. at 435.
51
Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,420 (1851).
52

THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 102-03 (Clark A. Nichols ed., 4th ed. 1924)
(emphasis added).
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Taxation, then, couples burdens on a broad swath of the population with
benefits from the use of tax revenues sprinkled over a similarly large portion
of society. Takings, on the other hand, burden one or a relatively narrow subset of property owners for projects with much wider social benefits.

3. Drawing the Line: The Unfair Apportionment Test.-This broadnarrow distinction is the first step of the classical approach to drawing the
line between taxation and takings. There will be a gray area of difficult cases.
Cooley's preceding quote thus introduced the second step in the classical test
for distinguishing takings from taxation: there is no taking if "the burdens ... fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear them." 53 Courts,
admitting the fundamental similarity of taxation and takings often used words
like "just," "equitable," or "fairly apportioned" to determine when compensation was or was not required for the application of a particular tax:
Exacting money by taxation and taking private property for public use, are different things. Both, it is true, are in one sense the exercise of a right to take the
property of individuals for public use, but there is a broad distinction between
them. Taxation exacts money from individuals as their share of a justly imposed
and apportioned general public burthen, and the equivalent is presumptively received in the benefits conferred by the government. Property taken for public
use from one or more individuals only, by right of eminent domain, is taken not
as his or their share of an apportioned public burthen, but as something distinct
from and more than his or their share of the public burthens, and therefore the
justice and necessity of a constitutional provision for compensation. 54

Courts applying this "fair apportionment" test explicitly cited the Takings Clause as the source of the rule that constrained the power of taxation:
There being no express constitutional declaration or prohibition directly applicable to the power or subject of taxation, and none which in terms secures
equality or uniformity in the distribution of public burthens, either general or
local, there is no clause to which the citizen can, with certainty, appeal for protection against an oppressive and ruinous discrimination under color of the taxing power, unless it be that which prohibits the taking of private property for
public use, without compensation. 55

Thus the classical test read Takings Clauses as requiring both a narrow and
a disproportionate impact before requiring compensation.
Epstein, in his restatement of the classical position, recognized the
danger of allowing takings to swallow up taxation, or vice versa: "The
question is whether these difficulties make it necessary to retreat to one of
two extremes, both of which seem quite untenable. Either no taxation ... is

53

/d.

54

Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118,130 (1864).
Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. 330,341 (I B. Mon. 1848) (holding that expanding town so as to impose
town taxes on plaintiff is not a taking).
55
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allowed, or all taxation ... is allowed." 56 Epstein's answer to these difficulties echoes the sources just cited: "the central insight is contained in a
principle of American eminent domain law, whereby the disproportionate
impact of a tax or regulation functions as an indirect measure of the adequacy of compensation."57

4. Courts Grant Legislatures Wide Latitude.-However, words like
"just," "fair apportionment," "equitable," or "disproportionate impact" as
employed by courts still do not define the line between taxation and takings
with any precision. Epstein solves this imprecision for income taxation by
asserting a close correspondence between income and benefits derived from
governmental services and goods. Based on this tight correlation, he argues
that only an income tax with one rate (a so-called "flat tax") satisfies the
Takings Clause. For Epstein, the progressive income taxation, under which
marginal rates increase with income, used by the United States dating back
to the Civil War, violates the Takings Clause. 58 Similarly, he argues that a
sales tax must fall on all goods, because a selective sales tax places disproportionate burdens on sellers of goods singled out for the tax. 59
Although in many respects similar, Epstein's views part ways with
classical doctrine. Classical courts and commentators believed that legislatures have very wide leeway in setting taxes, and judges were encouraged to
strike them down only in cases of extreme injustice or in cases of inequity
or unfair apportionment. In the words of an early treatise writer, "[t]he
power of taxation is a great governmental attribute, with which the courts
have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to interfere; but if abused,
the abuse should share the fate of all other usurpations." 60
In the following extended quotation, an antebellum court acknowledges
the deference due the legislature in establishing taxes, and the extraordinary
facts that need to be present in order to justify judicial intervention:
[The Takings Clause] was not intended to exclude or even to restrict the ordinary power of general or local taxation inherent in the legislative function and
conferred upon the legislative department of the government; and that there
must necessarily be vested in that department, a wide range of discretion, not
only as to the objects for which a tax, general or local, may be enforced, as to
which its judgment would seem to be conclusive, but also as to the particular
subjects or species of property which shall be liable to taxation, and as to the
56 Epstein, supra note 49, at 437.
57
!d. at 437-38.
58 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 297-300. Epstein's opinion is not entirely novel. In commenting on the
federal income tax in the 1890s, one commentator argued that the levy's progressive rate structure went beyond the power of taxation and amounted to a taking. See STANLEY, supra note 3, at 142 (citing David A.
Wells, Is the Existing Income Tax Unconstitutional?, F., Mar. 1895, at 18).
59 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94.
6
COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 795 (quoting SEDGWICK, CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY

°

LAW 414 (1857)).
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extent of territory within which a local tax shall operate. It would, therefore,
be a task of extreme delicacy, for the judiciary to decide upon its own mere
judgment, with respect to any of the particulars referred to, that the Legislature
has exceeded the limits of the discretionary power with which it is invested. . . . That limit can only consist in the discrimination to be made between what may with reasonable plausibility be called a tax, and for which it
may be assumed that the objects of the taxation are regarded by the Legislature
as forming a just compensation, and that which is palpably not a tax, but is,
under the form of a tax, or in some other form, the taking of private property
for the use of others or of the public, without compensation. Exact equality in
the distribution of public burthens, and especially of such as are local, is perhaps unattainable, and cannot form the test of the distinction referred to. There
must be a palpable and flagrant departure from equality in the burthen as imposed upon the persons or property bound to contribute, or it must be palpable
that persons or their property are subjected to a local burthen for the benefit
of others, or for purposes in which they have no interest, and to which they
are, therefore, not justly bound to contribute. The case must be one in which
the operation of the power will be at first blush, pronounced to be the taking of
private property without compensation, and in which it is apparent that the
burthen is imposed without any view to the interest of the individual in the objects to be accomplished by it. 61

Thus, under classical doctrine, the courts found taxes to be takings only in
extreme cases, where the so-called tax impacted a very small portion of the
population and provided no specific countervailing benefits to those liable
for the tax.
The Supreme Court, at the tum of the century, articulated a similar
rule. For instance, in Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, the Court
held unconstitutional taxes that are "so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation by its
necessary operation is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the
power to tax. "62 In 1921, the Court reaffirmed this principle in upholding a
Massachusetts state tax on income from intangibles that admittedly had a
disparate impact on some localities. As the Court declared,
a state tax law will be held to conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment only
where it proposes, or clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequality
between the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the arbitrary taking of property without compensation-to spoliation under the guise
of exerting the power of taxing. 63

When in 1916 the Supreme Court upheld the first income tax statute
enacted after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Court said that it
would strike down a tax statute only if it was "so arbitrary as to constrain to
the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of
61

Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. 330,344-45 (I B. Mon. 1848) (emphasis added).

62

173 u.s. 592, 615 (1899).
Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589,599 (1921) (citation omitted).

63
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property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth Amendment. "64 In 1934, the Court used similar language in upholding Oregon's
steep sales tax on margarine:
Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause contained in
the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon
Congress by the Constitution.... That clause is applicable to a taxing statute ... only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does
not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and
effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example,
the confiscation of property. 65

In summary, the classical view on the tax/takings line recognized the
fundamental similarity between the two mechanisms, and developed a
three-step test to distinguish them. First, this doctrine determined whether
the burden fell on many (tax-like) or few (takings-like). Second, it tried to
further delineate this many/few distinction by declaring that taxes must
fairly apportion burdens. Finally, realizing that a large gray area remained,
classical doctrine militated that courts should strike down tax legislation as
a taking only in the most extreme cases of disproportionate impact.
C. The Policy Goals of Takings Favor the Classical View

The previous subsection demonstrated the deep historical roots of the
view that it is the number of burdened parties, as well as the rough apportionment of burdens, which distinguishes taxes from takings. The older
pedigree of this classical view, alone, is scant reason to prefer it to the view
articulated by the five Justices in Eastern Enterprises that fungibility determines the line between taxes and takings. This subsection, however,
shows that the classical view better serves the various goals of the Takings
Clause.
In Armstrong v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the purpose of the Takings Clause in very concise terms. Here, the Court declared
that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar the Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." 66 Since Armstrong, the Court
has repeated this principle verbatim in virtually every takings case; in fact,
both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, in more than one case,
have cited this very same language. 67 And although the Armstrong decision
64
Bmshaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. I, 24-25 (1916). Note that the challenged tax had a progressive rate structure, and so Epstein would argue that it violated the Takings Clause. EPSTEIN, supra note
5, at 297-300; see also infra Parts IJI-IV (discussing progressive taxation in more detail).
65
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,44 (1934) (citations omitted) (rejecting due process challenge to a state tax of fifteen cents a pound on margarine). Again, note that Epstein argues that such a selective sales tax is a taking. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 297-300.
66
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
67
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 607 (2001 ); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
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did not reference it, the Court had made a similar declaration of purpose in
1893: requiring payment of just compensation "prevents the public from
loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government."68 I label this the "anti-singling-out" motivation for the Takings
Clause, in that it bars the government from singling out one or only a few
property owners to bear public burdens.
This anti-singling-out purpose is fairly general in scope. It is consistent with, and captures the essence of, a number of more specific theories
regarding the social ends served by the Takings Clause. Some scholars
have argued that the compensation requirement was designed to protect a
wealthy minority from majoritarian deprivations. 69 Proponents of this view
might define the range of governmental acts that unconstitutionally single
out the wealthy more broadly than the Continuous Burdens Principle
(CBP), as presented in Part IV, but they share this Article's basic perspective. Glynn Lunney, in articulating a theory seemingly diametrically opposed to minority exploitation, argued that concentrated minority interest
groups have excessive political power and would block socially desirable
legislation if not guaranteed compensation under the Takings Clause. 70 Although Lunny's concern about minoritarian oppression may be the opposite
of the first theory, the root evil that requires remedying is the same: avoiding singling out the few to bear the burdens of all. Frank Michelman argues
that the Takings Clause minimizes the demoralization that results when the
government concentrates losses in contexts where compensation is administratively feasible but not paid. 71 Although the meaning of "demoralization"
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522,554 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I, 9, 19 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
alternative holding); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,318-19 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 (1985); Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
163 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
68
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). The modern Court has
cited this language, in addition to the similar quotation from Armstrong, in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass 'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987}, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 146 (1978), and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). In addition, the Court cited Monongahela in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
238 (1897), the case in which, according to modem precedents, the Takings Clause was incorporated
against the states under the Due Process Clause.
69
See, e.g., William Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for
Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115 (1989); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the
Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988); EPSTEIN, supra note 5.
70
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1892, 1938-41 (1992). Lunney draws directly on Armstrong.
71
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, & Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1180-84 (1967).
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is somewhat obscure, the primary reason Michelman would require compensation is that losses are concentrated on one or a few citizens.
Other models focus not on any intentional acts by the government, but
on random losses inflicted by governmental measures. Under this view, the
compensation requirement is analogous to insurance coverage: all citizens
pay premiums in the form of a portion of their taxes and the government
makes indemnification payments to those property owners inordinately
burdened by governmental programs. 72 Fischel emphasizes disproportionate burdens in his application of Michelman's model to the military draft. 73
The anti-singling-out purpose encompasses these unintentional government
acts, along with their intentional counterparts discussed above; it operates at
a higher level of generality that does not distinguish between them.
The anti-singling-out rationale, thus, is common to these seemingly divergent theories and appears to be at the core of the purpose of the Takings
Clause. It has nothing to do with the distinction between general monetary
liabilities and specific goods embraced by a majority of the justices in Eastern Enterprises. Rather, it has much to do with the classical view that takings
and taxation should be distinguished based on the number of parties burdened
by the exaction. Armstrong's oft-repeated anti-singling-out principle is inconsistent with that aspect of Eastern Enterprises. Thus it is on policy
grounds, more than pedigree grounds, that this Article rejects the moneyspecific-asset distinction for drawing the line between taxes and takings.
III. THE PRIMARY BATILE GROUND TO DATE: LEGALITY OF
PROGRESSIVE T AX.A TION

There is very little modem commentary on how to distinguish taxation
from takings. If Eastern Enterprises accurately represents modem thinking
on the question, the lack of analysis is not surprising because there are no
gray areas or close cases under such an understanding of the Takings
Clause. What little scholarship there is primarily centers on whether progressive income taxation violates the Takings Clause. Richard Epstein, author of the earliest and most thorough analysis on the subject, maintains that
progressive income tax rates-marginal rates increasing with incomeimpose disproportionate burdens on the wealthy and, hence, violate the
classical view of the constraints the Takings Clause imposes on taxation.
However, those that defend progressive income taxation clearly constitute the majority of academics and judges. Yet the case made in support of
such progressive rates is surprisingly weak. This Part and Part IV, which
72

See Lawrence Blume & DanielL. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis,
72 CAL. L. REv. 569 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988);
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986).
73
William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military
Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1996).
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presents the Continuous Burdens Principle, make the stronger case that progressive income taxation does not violate the Takings Clause. The Article's
case in favor of progressive rates is tripartite. First, subpart liLA surveys
data ignored by both sides of the debate: the long history of progressive tax
rates in the United States for both income taxes and other forms of taxation.
Subpart III.A also briefly demonstrates that Supreme Court case law supports the constitutionality of progressive taxation. Subpart III.B then evaluates existing normative arguments against and in favor of progressive
income taxation.
A. The History of Progressive Taxation and Positive Legal Doctrine
1. History.-Progressive taxation dates back to the founding of the
Republic. Politicians across the political spectrum endorsed it. Thomas
Jefferson explicitly supported progressive taxation, declaring that a "means
of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation
below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise." 74 In 1798, Alexander Hamilton proposed a
progressive real property tax with rates increasing from twenty cents per
room for log houses to one dollar per room for houses with seven or more
rooms. 75 Although Congress did not enact Hamilton's proposal, it did pass
a similar progressive property tax, with rates starting at 0.2% for houses
valued from $100 to $1000, and rising up to 1% for houses valued at more
than $30,000. 76
In 1851, a New York state court explicitly rejected the argument that
the Constitution required flat rate taxation. 77 After listing three possible
modes of taxation in the form of a head tax or capitation (i.e., fixed amount
per person), a flat rate tax, and a progressive tax, the court gave the legislature the flexibility inherent in the classical view: "The application of any
one of these rules or principles of apportionment, to all cases, would be
manifestly oppressive and unjust. Either may be rightfully and wisely applied to the particular exigency to which it is best adapted." 78 The court
stated that the legislatures had mixed and matched these techniques in a variety of ways, all apparently consistent with New York's Takings Clause:
"Taxation is sometimes regulated by one of these principles, and sometimes
74

THOMAS JEFFERSON, To James Madison, in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1953).
75
GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 40 (1996).
76
HENRY CARTER ADAMS, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1816, at 54-56 (N.Y., Burt
Franklin 1970) (1884). In the founding era Congress also enacted at least one "luxury" tax, on carriages
used to transport persons. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. XLV, I Stat. 373 (1794). Though not formally progressive, taxes on luxuries are fundamentally similar to income taxes with high exemptions: both impact
only the wealthy.
77
People ex rei. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (1851 ).
78
!d. at 427.
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by another; and very often it has been apportioned without reference to locality or to the tax-payer's ability to contribute, or to any proportion between the burthen and the benefit. "79 Discussing one of the highest
grossing taxes of its day, the court noted that some tariffs fell on a broad
range of citizens, while others fell on a relatively narrow part of the community.80 The Court also noted that Congress imposed some of these tariffs
simply to raise revenue, while it imposed others to protect domestic industries.81 All of these taxes, the court maintained, were consistent with the
federal Takings Clause. 82
States began to enact income taxes in the 1800s, before the national government first imposed such a tax during the Civil War. By the 1850s, at least
seven states had passed an income tax. 83 These state income taxes contained
all the progressive features of today's national income tax: "[H]igh exemption levels, low and even progressive rates-were characteristic of these state
laws."84 Thus, it was no surprise that the first national income tax, enacted
during the Civil War, contained these same features. The exemption ranged
from $600 to $2000 in annual income; this meant that the tax reached only
0.2% to 1.3% of the population. 85 Congress changed the rates frequently, but
the structure was always progressive. Initially, rates ranged from 3% to 5%;
by the end of the war they ranged from 5% to 10%. 86
This progressive structure was no accident. Commenting on the 1862
tax, one scholar noted that "[t]he $600 exemption level reflected the intention to reach only a tiny, wealthy fraction of the population."87 Even a leading political opponent of the income tax in general, and progressive rates in
particular, admitted that "no one doubts our constitutional power to levy
this tax." 88 Thus, during the time when the classical view on the line between taxation and takings still prevailed, even opponents of progressive
income taxation conceded its constitutionality.
The national income tax disappeared in 1872, but Congress reinstituted
it in 1894. Although it had a single rate, 2%, its extraordinarily high ex79

/d.

80

/d.

81

/d.

82

/d.

83

Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See, e.g.,
DELOS Q. KINSMAN, THE INCOME TAX IN THE COMMONWEALTHS OF THE UNITED STATES 37-39 (1903);
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 388-406 (1914).
84
STANLEY, supra note 3, at 38.
85
Jd. at 40-41 tbls. 1.5, 1.6.
86
/d. at 41 tbl. 1.6.
87
/d. at 30.
88
/d. at 33 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., lsi Sess. 1715 (1864) (statement of Rep. Justin S.
Morrill)). Morrill did go on to label progressive taxation as "no less than a confiscation of property," but
his earlier admission of the measures' legality indicates that he used "confiscation" as a rhetorical as
opposed to a legal term.
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emption of $4,000, meant that the tax was very progressive, reaching only
0.13% of the population. 89 However, the Supreme Court struck down the
tax one year later, holding that an income tax was a "direct" tax and, hence,
had to be apportioned among the states based on population, not income. 90
The People soon initiated the amendment process to reverse the Supreme
Court's invalidation of an income tax. During this period, from 1896 when
the Court struck down the income tax, to 1913 when the states ratified the
Sixteenth Amendment authorizing a national income tax without apportionment among the states, progressive taxation was ubiquitous at the state
and local levels of government:
Since at least 1890 the climate within the state legislatures toward progressive
taxation had grown increasingly favorable. The states had exhibited in their
tax legislation widespread acceptance of the premises underlying congressional recourse to income taxation; specifically, they had enacted inheritance
and income tax laws which revealed their belief in the utility of the taxation of
accumulated wealth, at very low but progressive rates, using very high exemption levels . . . . In 1890 only six states maintained inheritance taxes . . . and
by 1913, 35 of the 48 states had enacted such laws . . . . Of the taxes in use in
1911, at the peak of action over the ratification of the [federal] income tax
amendment, about 60 percent were progressive in nature. 91

During this period, one state court upheld a progressive income tax against,
inter alia, a charge that it was confiscatory.92
Thus, during the era in which the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment,
progressive taxation simply was not controversial. As one scholar explained:
[T]he widespread existence of inheritance taxation, and of judicial approval of
the whole progressive package, eroded the plausibility of the old litany of evils
which opponents of such taxation had marshaled since the 1890s: that progressive taxation meant a war of poor against rich, that it constituted "confiscation,"
and that it represented the majority run amok through the law. 93

Indeed, few questioned progressivity during the proposal and ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment. Debate "was concerned chiefly with the propriety of income as a tax base. Again there was some subsidiary concern
with progression and it was well recognized that it would be possible to have
a graduated tax under the Amendment."94 Senator Hughes implicitly admit89

JOHN F. WtTIE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 72-73 (1985).
Pollock v. Fanners' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 584-86 (1895). Article I of the Constitution,
in two separate sections, requires that "direct" federal taxes be apportioned among the states according to
population. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 4.
91
STANLEY, supra note 3, at 203-05.
92
See State ex rei. Bolens v. Frear, 134 N.W. 673 (Wis. 1912)(holding that a progressive income tax
was not so confiscatory as to violate basic principles of justice and equality).
93
STAN LEY, supra note 3, at 209.
94
WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 12
(1953).
90
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ted as much. He objected that the Sixteenth Amendment, as proposed, "did
not provide for 'uniformity' in taxation-an attack on [the possibility of]
graduated rates" under the Amendment as written. 95 The senator's objection,
in other words, implied an understanding that, without the word "uniformity,"
the Sixteenth Amendment permitted progressive income taxation.
Another fact from which we can infer the constitutionality of progressive income tax under the Sixteenth Amendment, is that the first income tax
enacted after the Sixteenth Amendment's ratification had progressive rates
and relatively high exemptions. Passed in 1913, this income tax exempted
the first $3,000 of income (or $4,000 for married couples), and imposed
marginal rates, starting at 1% and rising to 7%, for income over $500,000. 96
None of these terms raised any hackles. "At the time the tax was accepted
as a natural and inevitable culmination of the constitutional amendment." 97
"If progressive taxation were so patently offensive to the democratic ideal
that it could be characterized as an unconstitutional taking, at least a hint of
that should have appeared in the legislative history. There is none." 98

2. Positive Legal Doctrine.--Given the long use and acceptance of
progressive taxation, coupled with the universal understanding that Congress
likely would enact a progressive income tax under the proposed Sixteenth
Amendment, challenges were far from common. According to Blum and
Kalven, a short, vociferous challenge to progressive rates that appeared in
1916 was "perhaps most noteworthy because it appears to have been virtually
the last gasp of constitutional objection to the principle ofprogression."99
Massey attempts to revive this objection. He argues that the Supreme
Court has never directly held that progressive taxes are not a taking. However, Massey's position is difficult to maintain. Although the Court failed
to provide a crystal-clear ruling on the issue, this failure may be due more
to the fact the plaintiffs were unlikely to raise an issue that everyone thinks
is a sure loser. In fact, dicta gleaned from a number of Supreme Court
cases uniformly and strongly suggest that progressive tax rates do not violate the Takings Clause.
For instance, the Supreme Court upheld a state inheritance tax containing progressive rates against an equal protection challenge. 100 Two years
95

STANLEY, supra note 3, at 219 (citing I Senate Journal 618 (1911)).
WITTE, supra note 89, at 77-78.
97
!d. at 77.
98
Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect Taxes'': The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation,
18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. Ill, 126 (1999).
99
BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 94, at 6 (citing Frank Warren Hackett, The Constitutionality of
the Graduated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427, 440 (1916)). Though Massey does not cite Hackett's
article, he elaborates on many of the same arguments. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 2.
100
See Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding Illinois inheritance tax).
Justice Brewer, in dissent, argued that such unequal taxation violated the Constitution, though it is unclear
what clause he thought the tax violated. See id. at 301-03.
96
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later it upheld the progressive federal inheritance tax. 101 The Court explicitly relied on historical practice to buttress the constitutionality of progressive taxation, noting that such levies "were enacted without question from
the very beginning, and have continued in an unbroken line to the present
time, sanctioned by the founders of our institutions and approved in practical execution by all the illustrious men who have directed the public destinies of the nation. " 102 Consistent with the classic view of the distinction
between taxation and takings, the Knowlton Court did concede that in extreme cases taxes could amount to confiscation:
If a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary and confiscatory exaction is imposed bearing the guise of a progressive or any other form of tax, it will be time
enough to consider whether the judicial power can afford a remedy by applying
inherent and fundamental principles for the protection of the individual .... 103

The strong implication of the Court's language is that the progressive taxes
at issue were not "confiscatory"; moreover, the language suggests that progressive taxation is not per se unconstitutional.
The Court repeated these same themes in Brushaber v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 104 in which it rejected a litany of constitutional objections to
the first tax enacted under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court, again,
emphasized the long tradition of progressive taxation in the United States,
declaring that all challenges raised "disregard[] the fact that in the very
early history of the Government a progressive tax was imposed by Congress
and that such authority was exerted in some if not all of the various income
taxes enacted prior to 1894." 105 And once again, the Court embraced the
classical view that, in extreme cases, asymmetric taxation might violate the
Takings Clause:
[A] seeming exercise of the taxing power, [if] the act complained of was soarbitrary [that it was] not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property,
that is, a taking ... in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or what is equivalent . .. so wanting in basis for classification as to produce a gross and patent
inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion. 106

Stanley, a leading historian of the federal income tax concludes that the
"opinion in Brushaber left little room for dispute over the firm tradition of
progressive income taxation in the United States." 107

101

See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding federal inheritance tax).

102

!d. at 94.

103

Jd. at 109-10.
240 u.s. 1 (1916).

104
105
106

107

!d. at 25 .
!d. at 24-25.
STAN LEY, supra note 3, at 229.
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B. Normative Considerations of Progressive Income Taxation

Besides these strong historical and legal grounds supporting the constitutionality of progressive income taxation, this Article is also interested in
the social desirability of such a tax, from both an efficiency and fairness
perspective. Here, however, the evidence supporting progressive income
taxation is much less clear. The following subsections weigh the case for
progressive taxation from the perspectives of equity (fairness), efficiency
(maximizing social welfare), and a combination of these criteria applicable
if the wealthy tend to benefit disproportionately from public services.

1. Equity.-Opponents of progressive taxation have used various
analogies in arguing that single-rate income taxation, also called strictly proportional taxation, or a flat tax, is a "neutral" and, hence, fair alternative. The
roots of this idea date to the writings of Adam Smith, who analogized a nation's citizens to co-owners of realty. Under the common law, joint owners
contribute to necessary expenses in proportion to their interest in the estate.
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to ... the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expence of government
to the individuals of a great nations, is like the expence of management to the
joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to
their respective interests in the estate. 108

F.A. Hayek proffered substantially the same defense of strict proportionality, stating, "[A] person who commands more of the resources of society will also gain proportionately more from what the government has
contributed." 109 More recent scholarship has repeated the mantra of flatrate taxation as fair taxation. 110
Yet other scholars have questioned any a priori reason to favor singlerate taxation. Boris Bittker, for instance, declared over thirty years ago that
"proportionality is no more entitled to a presumption of fairness than pro108

2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 5,
ch. 2, pt. 2, at 350 (Edward Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1904) (1776). Opponents of progressive
taxation citing this passage either overlook or decline to cite Smith's comments in support of progressive
taxation a few pages later: "A tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich;
and in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but
something more than in that proportion." /d. at 368.
109
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 316 (1960); see a/so MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 175 (1962).
110
Massey, supra note 2, at 123 ("[T]he tax burdens on incomes ... should be an equal proportion of
all incomes.").
The flat tax certainly gives a respectable matching [of burdens and benefits] .... In addition, a
flat tax dispenses with the need to choose one of an infinite set of arbitrary progressive schedules.
Some other baseline ... might well be part of a more comprehensive constitutional scheme, but in
its absence, the flat tax is the most "natural" approach.
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 298-99.
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gression. " 111 Scholars have continued to question this premise:
Perhaps the most significant and pervasive assumption is that the burden of
prooflies on supporters ofprogressivity. A proportionate tax is often seen as
"natural" or "neutral," and therefore is thought to require no justificatory theory . . . . The belief that progressive and regressive taxes must meet affmnative burdens operates as a default assumption in favor of a proportionate
tax .... tt2

Barbara Fried highlights the intellectual weakness of the presumption
in favor of a flat tax, finding that "[v]irtually all defenses of proportionality
ultimately boil down to some variant of 'I know fairness when I see it,'
claim, or [are tautologies]." 113 Fried pinpoints the "missing piece," in regard to arguments for strictly proportional taxation, as follows:
I mean only to try to dislodge the apparently intractable notion that [proportionate taxation] deserves to be adopted because it is "fair" in itself, or because
it is an obvious instantiation of some other fairness principle. I am not arguing
in favor of progressivity, regressivity, or any other rate structure on fairness
grounds. The deeper moral is that no sensible theory of distributive justice
would fix on rate structures themselves as fair or unfair. Rate structures are
just a means to operationalize other prior, moral commitments about the proper
role of government. 114

Bankman and Thomas Griffith concur. After questioning the twin assumptions that a proportionate tax is "somehow 'natural'" while progressive
taxes "require justificatory theories," they maintain that "all rate structures
must be premised upon, and measured by, a theory of distributive justice." 115
Bankman and Griffith conclude that "it is surprisingly difficult to derive a
theory of distributive justice that supports a proportionate tax." 116
Not all commentators have ignored this requirement. For instance,
Blum and Kalven noted that
[t]o pass a judgment on whether a given schedule of graduated rates achieves
"tax justice" from a redistributive perspective, we must resort to criteria that
lie altogether outside the province of taxation . . . . What is at stake, and all
that is at stake, is the central and formidable question of distributive justice in
the society. 117

111
Boris Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be?, in BORIS BtTIKER, COLLECI'ED
LEGAL ESSAYS 229, 233 {1989).
112
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905,1910-11 (1987).
113
Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REv. 157, 189
(1999).
114
!d. at 158.
115
Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1907.
116
/d.at1912.
117
BLUM & KALVEN,JR., supra note 9, at 14--15.
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Thus, Blum and Kalven evaluated assumptions about social welfare
that are necessary to justify a progressive tax. For example, one common
justification is that money has diminishing marginal utility for all or almost
all people: the first dollars spent, on housing and shelter, yield much more
satisfaction than the last dollars spent on hobbies or luxuries. If this is true,
progressive taxation will increase social welfare, defined as maximizing the
sum of all persons' utility, because such taxation will take money from
those who used it for relatively lower utility luxuries and subsidize those
lacking higher utility necessities. Measuring the marginal utility of money
individually or across persons, however, is not possible. Blum and Kalven
assert, without citation and without reasoned argument, that in order "[t]o
yield progressive rates of tax ... the utility curve for money has to decline
very sharply." 118 Such a statement may have had intuitive appeal at the
time it was written, when marginal income tax rates in the United States
topped 70%; however, such a statement may be easily challenged today,
when the top marginal rate is under 40%. 119
This is an important quibble, and yet neither side of the debate can
muster convincing, objective evidence in order to support its arguments.
But there is a more fundamental objection to flat-rate taxation: it requires
rather strong assumptions to rationalize such a narrow choice. Flat tax advocates typically invoke benefits theory, which justifies taxation based on
benefits conferred. As Fried pointedly notes, however, "benefits theory
leads to proportionate taxation if and only if the quantity of publicly supplied goods that people consume is proportionate to income ....120 Epstein
argues that the assumption that the benefit of public goods increases in proportion to income "gives a respectable matching" and then relies on the assertion, seriously questioned above, that "the flat tax is the most 'natural'
approach." 121
However, on closer inspection, there is nothing at all "natural" about
the assumption that the benefit of public goods increases in strict proportion
to income. "As even proponents of proportionate tax concede, that premise
is highly implausible (a 'not clearly inappropriate assumption' is the best
that Milton Friedman can do). " 122 Fried makes a strong case that, for many
public goods, benefits theory suggests not a flat-tax rate, but a flat-dollar
tax: independent of income, a so-called capitation, or head tax.
[The presumption of proportionality] is doubtful for many publicly provided
goods, such as roads, fire protection, garbage collection, and schools. It is
118

!d. at 18 (emphasis added).
For historical tax rates, see The Century Foundation fig. 3b, at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/
Basics/Tax!History.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
120
Barbara H. Fried, Why Do Libertarians Love Proportionate Taxation? The Case of Gauthier's
Morals by Agreement 3 (Stanford Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 12, 2000).
121
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 298-99.
122
Fried, supra note 120, at 3 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note I 09, at 175).
119
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clearly wrong for others, such as clean air, defense, and broadcast spectra, that
are true "public goods" in the technical economic sense ... As public goods,
of course, everyone consumes the exact same good-in which case a far more
plausible outcome of benefits taxation would seem to be a highly regressive
tax, at the extreme, a head tax, in which Bill Gates and Joe Dishwasher each
123
pay the same fixed fee for access to a fixed package of public goods
0

0

0

0

Fried's contention, that it is more natural to assume that the benefit of
many public goods and services is equal and independent of wealth, seems
at least as realistic as the assumption of flat-rate advocates that such benefits increase in strict proportion to income or wealth.
Although this Article will ultimately question the premise that all citizens benefit in equal absolute amounts from public goods, such as police
protection, 124 the power of Fried's point is that the premises of flat-tax advocates naturally lead to a head tax rather than a flat tax. Why are they so
hesitant to follow their premises to their logical conclusion?
Further insight into the thinking of flat-tax advocates may be gained by
considering income tax exemptions, such as exempting the first $X of income from any taxation at all. Surprisingly,
almost none of the proponents of proportionality ... have in fact supported
proportionate taxation. Instead, they have supported a so-called degressive
version of a progressive tax, in which the first x dollars of income or consumption, sufficient to cover basic needs, is taxed at a zero rate, and all income or
consumption above that is taxed at the same positive rate. 125

Blum and Kalven were quite frank in analyzing the motivation for this exception: "One obstacle that confronts this aspiration toward tax neutrality ... arises from the brute fact that there is poverty . . . . Under these
circumstances, a fully neutral tax just does not work." 126
At least one opponent of progressive taxation, Justice Field, had the
courage of his convictions and condemned exemptions as illegal forms of
progressivity, on par with a progressive rate structure. 127 In the main, however, opponents of progressive taxation, cognizant of this "brute fact," often
seem oblivious to another fact: that introducing an exemption into the income tax results in a type of progressive tax. An article challenging the
constitutionality of progressive taxation dismissed this problem in one
blithe sentence. 128

123

!d.

124

See infra Part !V.B.
Fried, supra note 113, at 160-61. Use of the term "degressive" to denote progression achieved by
exempting the first $X of income apparently was coined in Blum & Kalven, supra note 9, at 12-13.
126
BLUM & l<ALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at II.
127
Pollock v. Fanners' Loan & Trust Co., !57 U.S. 429,599-600,607-08 (1895) (Field, J., concurring).
128
"We may dismiss a consideration of the size of the exemption." Hackett, supra note 99, at 430.
125
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Yet, the inconsistency of exemptions with a flat tax is manifest:
It is hard to overstate, however, the difficulties that [conceding the necessity of
an exemption for the poor] entails for those whose opposition to any greater
degree of progressivity via a graduated rate structure is based on the fact that
such progressivity is motivated by purely redistributive concerns ... why stop
there? ... why not raise the exemption level [higher]? ... Surely, Frank Taussig was right in declaring many years ago that "[t]he demand for the exemption of the lowest tier of incomes results from the same state of mind as the
advocacy of progressive taxation .... " 129

The almost universal support for exemptions among critics of progressive
rates "suggests that fairness as well as efficiency grounds underlie their
support for proportional taxation." 130 This Article will address efficiency
shortly. For present purposes, however, once one admits that some notion
of redistributive justice (i.e., notions of fairness or equity), it is difficult to
explain why some level of exemption is precisely the correct amount of
fairnessP 1 Most advocates of strict proportionality in taxation simply fail
to specify what social benefit function they aim to maximize; without providing a metric to compare results, there is simply no basis for choosing one
tax policy over another. 132

2. Efficiency.-Specifying a social welfare function is controversial.
There is no consensus on the proper objective function. Perhaps for this
reason, "[t]o the extent that supporters of proportional taxation do offer a
positive case for their position, the argument is based almost exclusively on
efficiency grounds." 133 Flat-tax advocates note that progressive taxation
may impose stiff marginal tax rates (i.e., the rate applied to the last dollars
earned) on high-income earners, many of whom are society's most productive members. These taxes encourage substitution of leisure for cash income and result in the deadweight loss inherent in all forms of taxation
avoidable by substitution. A similar argument applies to savings decisions:
as the income tax applies to dividends, interest, and other investment
income, higher marginal rates will impose suboptimal substitution away
from taxed activities.
In rebuttal, Bankman and Griffith first note that it is not progressivity
129
Fried, supra note 113, at 161-62 (last alteration in original) (quoting FRANK TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS 499 (1999)).
130
Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1966.
131
Blum and Kalven offer one possible standard. They maintain that there is universal support for an
exemption that takes the truly poor off the tax rolls: "The much more fundamental question ... is whether
society should concern itself with redistribution only insofar as it is necessary to deal with poverty, or
whether it should extend its concern to inequalities of 'surplus' income." BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note
9, at 14. Defining the poverty level may be tractable. Note that this is consistent with the classical view,
under which taxation to support true paupers was permissible. See infra text accompanying note 217.
132
See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1913.
133
/d. at 1966.
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itself that imposes deadweight loss, but rather high rates. Thus, a progressive set of rates with a moderate top rate will impose less deadweight loss
than a flat tax at a high rate. Moreover, drawing on formal models of optimal taxation, Bankman and Griffith describe an efficient income tax that is
progressive in its overall structure. Specifically, James Mirrlees has shown
that, in a simple model making minimal assumptions, the optimal tax structure is ( 1) a cash transfer payment to lower wage workers (called a "demogrant"), coupled with (2) declining marginal tax rates on higher incomes.
Declining rates mean that the marginal rate for very productive workers is
relatively low so they have less incentive to substitute leisure for work. 134
There is a deeper problem for advocates of strict proportionality arguing
against progressivity on efficiency grounds. Flat-rate income taxation causes
deadweight losses similar to progressive taxation; in other words, because
taxpayers can reduce their tax bill by working less, both forms of taxation involve deadweight losses. Thus, "the same efficiency-based reasoning that rejects a progressive tax in favor of a proportionate tax would, if applied
consistently, reject a proportionate tax in favor of a lump-sum head tax ... an
exclusive concern for economic efficiency implies a regressive, rather than
proportional, tax." 135 As has been noted, however, there is almost universal
opposition to head taxes and regressive taxes in general. This opposition implies that even flat tax supporters do not rely on efficiency alone in selecting a
desirable tax policy. They implicitly try to satisfy some equity concerns, and
those equity concerns force them to deviate from a head tax and even from
strictly proportionate taxation (i.e., without any low-income exemption).
Blum and Kalven point out a somewhat nonconventional efficiency argument for progressive taxation: it may be the least-cost way for the wealthy
to quiet social disorder among the poor. They observe that "it may be that
there are limits to the peaceful tolerance by the mass of the population of
great disparities in wealth and that a closer approximation to equality is important insurance against revolution." 136 Blum and Kalven cite Henry C.
Simons for an extended defense of what might be characterized as extortion:
[P]rogressive taxation is a workable, democratic method for dealing with inequality. The alternative of unionists is to send workers out in packs to exploit
and expropriate by devices which resemble those of bandit armies. The one
device is inherently orderly, peaceful, gradualist, and efficient. It is the device
oflaw. The other is inherently violent, disruptive, and wasteful in the extreme.
One calls for debate, discussion, and political action; the other for fighting and
promiscuous expropriation. 137
134
!d. at 1918-21; see also id. at 1945-48; James A . Mirr1ees, An Exploration in the Theory of
Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. Sruo. 175 (1971).
135
!d. at 1913 ; seealsoFried,supranote 113,at 19()...91.
136
BLUM & KALYEN, JR., supra note 94, at 77.
137
!d. at 71 n.178 (quoting Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON . 19
(1944)).
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Epstein takes a less sanguine view, deeming redistributionary measures designed to buy social peace as "little more than a strategic bribe." 138
It may seem strange to classify this social bribery as an efficient practice
because economics usually assumes that all actors are law-abiding, or that the
police and courts effectively can curtail extortion instead of indulging it. If,
however, one assumes that the poor are willing and able to inflict costs on
their wealthier neighbors, redistributionary taxation may be superior to the alternatives (e.g., social unrest, or expensive expansion of the police force).

3. Progressivity as a Proxy for Disproportionate Benefits ofLaw and
Order to the Wealthy.-This subsection briefly explores a couple of closely
related justifications for progressive taxation, both of which revolve around
benefits to law and order that accrue disproportionately to the wealthy. The
first justifies progressivity as an implicit wealth tax on non-incomeproducing property. The legal system creates an environment that not only
enhances the ability to generate income, but also protects accumulated
wealth. The income tax imposes countervailing burdens on those benefiting
from a safe environment for earning income and imposes such burdens on
those forms of wealth that generate income (e.g., stock dividends, bond interest, and patent royalties). Yet, forms of wealth that do not generate income, such as furs, jewelry, and vintage wine, escape taxation despite the
fact that their owners benefit from legal protection of such property every
bit as much as generators of income and owners of income-producing
wealth. 139 In theory, we could impose a separate tax on such wealth, but
administratively this might be expensive. However, progressivity in income taxation may achieve a similar allocation of burdens at a lower administrative cost. The key assumption behind using progressivity to mimic
a tax on non-income-producing wealth is that, as income increases, wealth
in general increases disproportionately. There is strong empirical evidence
for this relationship. 140
138

supra note 5, at 316.
In a future article, the author will explore a self-reporting wealth tax that may be administratively
cheap. The key idea is that citizens who do not report some form of wealth will not be eligible for most
forms of legal protection. The law would still protect simple possession (to prevent chaos); thus, for example, the police would always prevent someone from ripping jewelry off the owner's body. The courts
would also entertain a private suit for recovery if the owner could identify the thief. For an owner who did
not report the jewelry on his wealth tax return, however, the police would not help recover property once
stolen. The tax would exclude those forms of wealth that generate income or capital gains that present national and state income taxes reach. It would also exclude wealth subject to separate taxation (e.g., real
property). For administrative simplicity, the tax would include a relatively large exemption, so that most
people would not have to file to obtain full protection for their wealth. To encourage voluntary reporting,
insurers would be obligated to report all personal property insured above the exempted amount. The author
argues that a special excise tax on such property is less workable, as it is relatively easy to buy most forms
of personal property out of the taxing jurisdiction and import them without paying such a "use" tax.
140
"(A]s adjusted gross income (AGI}-the primary measure of income in the current income taxincreases, wealth increases disproportionately." David J. Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REv. 499,503 (2000) (providing data to support assertion).
EPSTEIN,

139
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For similar reasons, law and order may be a luxury good disproportionately desired by those with the most to lose from radical change or
chaos. Arthur Pigou, a leading neoclassical economist, and no radical, suggested as much:
[P]eople's economic well-being depends on the whole system of law, including the laws of property, contract and bequest, and not merely upon the law of
taxes. To hold that the law about taxes ought to affect different people's satisfactions equally, while allowing that the rest of the legal system may properly
affect them very unequally, seems not a little arbitrary. 141

Leo Martinez captured the same idea: "The intangible well-being represented by economic and social stability are perhaps most valuable to the
wealthy." 142 These observations are nothing new. As Stanley has noted:
Proponents of the renewal of the [income) tax [in the early 1870s] generally
voiced support on two grounds: that those with the greatest wealth had the
greatest ability to pay, and, more important, that they received the most benefits from the government and therefore had the greatest responsibility to pay a
tax on the product of those benefits. 143

Arguments that the wealthy benefit disproportionately from goods and services provided by the state thus have a long pedigree.
Implicit in these arguments is the idea that, at least to some extent, we
can apportion the benefits of basic governmental services, such as police
and courts. Such services certainly have some of the attributes of public
goods; accordingly, there is no way to determine market prices (i.e., fees)
for their consumption. Blum and Kalven expand on the concept of public
goods in order to question whether the wealthy benefit disproportionately
from the existence of law and order:
Although admittedly many expenditures of government cannot be traced directly, there is, as was suggested in the discussion of benefit theory, some
plausibility to the assumption that all citizens benefit equally from such expenditures. The clearest instance is that of military expenditures for exterior
security. Here the life and freedom of everyone in the community are
equally at stake, and in this sense everybody equally benefits from the protection. 144

Massey makes many of the same arguments about the military, as well as
the police:
A national defense that is adequate to protect Americans from external harm to
their persons will also protect their property at no extra cost. Moreover, the
level of protection necessary to defend tangible property does not vary propor141
142
143
144

ARTHUR C. P1GOU, A STUDY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 44 (3d rev. ed. 1951).
Martinez, supra note 98, at 147.
STANLEY, supra note 3, at46.
BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 94,at 77 .
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tionally with its value ... the cost of protecting intangible assets is a fixed
cost, unrelated to the assets' value. 145

These opinions, that basic peace and order either benefit citizens
equally or in strict proportion to wealth, are based on intuition alone; moreover, there are equally plausible arguments to the contrary. The wealthy
have much more to lose from either a foreign invasion or a radical change
in the internal legal system. The poor rationally might well favor little or
no national defense. Massey's assertion that "the cost of protecting intangible assets [by far the largest component of wealth] is a fixed cost, unrelated to the assets' value," is not plausible. 146 The greater the wealth at
stake, the more others will be willing to expend to expropriate it. For example, valuable patents are more attractive targets for infringement, and
thus the state will need to devote more regulatory, police, and judicial
resources to protecting such property rights.
Finally, note that using only an income tax enables non-incomebearing wealth to escape taxation. There are other feasible bases for a
broad-based tax that could yield revenues equal to the present income tax; a
wealth tax is one such alternative. It is difficult to determine whether such
a tax would be more efficient, but it appears no less equitable. Both target
ability to pay in a rough way and it is not clear which more precisely serves
this standard of fairness. "The classic equitable justification for the income
tax is that a tax should be based on ability to pay and income is the best
measure of ability to pay.... however, a person's wealth appears to be as
fair a basis for distributing a tax as her income." 147 To the extent that
wealth, especially non-income-bearing wealth, increases more than proportionately with income, a flat-rate wealth tax would impose burdens similar
to a progressive income tax.
In summary, there are good policy arguments in favor of progressive
income taxation; however, these arguments are hardly dispositive . As a
matter of history and positive law, the case for the legality of progressive
taxation is strong. 148 Nonetheless, advocates of progressive taxation have
failed to provide guidance on how to determine when taxes turn into takings. Missing is a doctrinal principle that unifies taxation with other
sources of potential takings and that demonstrates, under general principles of takings law, that progressive taxation does not violate the Takings
145
146

Massey, supra note 2, at 106--07.
/d.

147

Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 140, at 500.
After reviewing the evidence, it is somewhat difficult to understand the attraction of strictly proportionate tax rates. Two articles have suggested that flat rates may be a sort of focal point, a solution that
stands out for its simplicity and uniqueness as an intermediate position between regressive and progressive
rates. "Because it is so simple, a tax structure that imposes the same rate on all individuals is more 'prominent' than any of the countless rate structures that impose different rates on individuals of different rate
classes." Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1914; see also Fried, supra note 113, at 193-95.
148
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Clause, even though other taxes do (e.g., the "Bill Gates Tax"). The classical view's two-part test (wide impact and fair apportionment) is a starting place: since our current progressive income tax impacts a large
percentage of the population, it passes the first part of the classical standard. One then confronts the second part of the classical test, whether
progressive taxation "unfairly apportions" the burden of taxation. This
part of the test provides little guidance, as many divergent definitions exist for unfair apportionment. Moreover, this standard does not exclude arguments, such as Epstein's, that progressive rates by definition impose
disproportionate burdens. Accordingly, the next section, Part IV, explains
the continuous burdens principle (CBP), a rule of general application that
illustrates why progressive income taxation is not a taking, though the Bill
Gates Tax is.
IV. THE CONTINUOUS BURDENS PRINCIPLE
In arguing that all progressive taxation amounts to a taking, Massey
complains that fellow professors dismissed Epstein's Takings book "because it stated a conclusion that was unpalatable to the orthodoxy of the political left that dominates academia." 149 Although it is difficult to verify
such an imputation of collective state of mind, my problem with Epstein's
thesis is less colorful: it deems unconstitutional existing practices and programs long viewed as beyond challenge. In particular, the thesis that progressive income taxation violates the Takings Clause is counter to
longstanding and continuing practice.
Current doctrine that must justify progressive taxation, however, has its
own problems. For our purposes, its biggest shortcoming is its absolute
rule that taxation is never a taking. Thus, for example, a steep tax aimed at
the single richest person in the nation, like the Bill Gates Tax example discussed previously, does not violate the Takings Clause under current doctrine. This is in tension with the Supreme Court's oft-repeated language
from Armstrong that the core purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar the
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. " 150
Such a steeply progressive tax is also in acute tension with the Supreme
Court's foundational declaration that when diminution "reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act." 151

149

Massey, supra note 2, at 85-86.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
151
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). Holmes restated this rule in the context of regulation: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." /d. at 415. Nothing in Mahon suggests that this principle
applies to regulation and regulation only.
150
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The Continuous Burdens Principle (CBP) developed in this Part provides a doctrinal middle ground, a rule under which progressive taxation
generally is deemed not a taking, but under which the extreme progressivity
of the Bill Gates tax is deemed a taking. This undertaking has surprising
similarity to Epstein's work. He aimed to develop rules that avoided the
extremes of declaring that either no tax was a taking or that every tax was.
He asked, "How can we avoid this extreme result, steer a middle course,
and identify those forms of taxation ... that should survive, and those that
should be condemned?" 152 The CBP draws the line between taxation and
takings at a different location than does Epstein, but it shares his view that
at some point taxation surely can shade over into a taking.
A. The Continuous Burdens Principle
1. Basic Idea.-The CBP can be viewed as no more than a formal,
and more rigorous, version of the principle enunciated in Armstrong: the
Takings Clause "bar[s] the Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole." 153 Instead of looking at absolute burdens to
property owners, independent of burdens imposed on other citizens in the
condemning jurisdiction, the idea is that the marginal burden imposed on
an owner or group of owners must be examined. By marginal burden I
mean the amount by which the burden imposed on an owner or group of
owners equally burdened exceeds the burden imposed on the next most
burdened owner.
Applying this standard to every owner in a certain jurisdiction yields
the CBP: if a governmental measure imposes costs in such a way that there
are no discontinuous "jumps" in marginal burdens, there is no taking. One
way to picture the CBP's application is to imagine a chain of comparisons,
from the burden imposed on the least burdened person (B[J]) to the burden
imposed on the most burdened person (B[N}). The CBP requires that each
difference in the following series be relatively small:

B[2]-B[l], B[3]-B[2], ... , B[N]-B[N-1]
If there are discontinuous jumps in the series-any difference that exceeds
some minimal threshold-there may be a taking.
In order to explore the virtues of the CBP, I will use burden curves,
which are simple graphical devices that encapsulate marginal benefits pictorially. Burden curves come in two varieties: gross burden curves, which do
not include any offsetting benefits; and net burden curves, which include
such benefits. One constructs a gross burden curve by "lining up" property
owners in order on the horizontal axis, from the person least burdened by a
152
153

Epstein, supra note 49, at 435.
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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governmental measure, to the person most burdened. One then graphs the
burden imposed on each person along the vertical axis. Given the ordering
of persons along the horizontal axis, the resulting curve can never slope
upward; it must be everywhere flat or decreasing. Consider, for instance, a
gross burdens curve for the taking of a single house without payment of
compensation:

FIGURE

1

Gross Burdens,
Taking of a Single House
Without Compensation
owner
everyone else

0

Gross
Burden

-

The large jump in this curve is a graphical clue that compensation is required under the CBP. Generally, a gross or net benefit curve violates the
CBP when its slope becomes excessively steep along any interval.
One derives net burden curves from gross benefit curves by raising
each point to reflect the benefit that each person received as a result of the
governmental program (e.g., from taking a property, spending tax revenues,
regulating). Weighing benefits as implicit compensation is an established
rule in condemnation law} 54 When one factors in benefits, one does notreorder people. On a net burden curve they remain in the order established
154

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (stating that "average reciprocity of advantage" in a public measure can excuse obligation to pay just compensation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,715 (1987).
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for gross burdens. This is done to retain information about the structure of
the tax or other burden imposed. Note, then, that net benefit curves need
not be flat or downward sloping; they can and at times will have positive
slopes over some range of persons. Ultimately one is interested in net benefit curves, as they reflect true burdens borne. Sharp jumps, or kinks in a net
burden curve correspond to discontinuous marginal burdens, which are violations of the CBP. Consider the net burden curve for the taking of a single
house, without compensation, under the assumption that the resulting governmental project, such as a road, benefits all citizens equally:

FIGURE

2

Net Burdens,
Taking of a Single House
Without Compensation

0
Net Benefit/
Burden

This curve starkly illustrates that taking a single piece of property for a social benefit, without compensation, imposes a discontinuous burden on the
owner of the taken parcel.
Sometimes, especially for general revenue taxes, the allocation of
benefits is far from clear. In order to draw net burden curves in such cases,
we must start with the gross burdens curve and derive a net burdens curve
by making assumptions about the allocation of benefits from governmental
use of resources gleaned from the people.
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2. Defining Burdens.-Before proceeding, one must carefully specify how one measures burdens and benefits. There are two obvious candidates: absolute dollars and percentages of the property taken by the
government. Embedded in this choice between the two alternatives are
fundamental issues of fairness of which there is little social consensus. This
section makes no attempt to prove that one choice or the other is fairer,
based on some axiomatic theory of justice or on a carefully defined social
welfare function. Rather, this subsection endeavors to show that using percent burdens as the relevant metric for takings analysis is consistent with
widely held assumptions about fairness. Most importantly, it is consistent
with the assumptions of those who, contrary to the argument of this Article,
claim that progressive income taxation is a taking.
If one uses absolute dollars to measure burdens, discontinuity in the
distribution of the asset being taxed/taken will affect the continuity of burdens in ways that almost nobody seems to find relevant. For example, consider a flat-rate income tax that almost no mainstream theorists find
objectionable. Assume that Bill Gates has a substantially higher income
than the next highest income taxpayer. If one uses absolute dollars due,
even a flat tax produces discontinuous burdens:

FIGURE 3

Gross Burdens of Flat Tax
Burdens in Absolute$$
Bill Gates Has Outlier Income
2nd Highest
Inco;e

·~I
Gross
Burden
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Bill Gates's tax bill will substantially exceed that of the next highest taxed
person; thus, using absolute dollar burdens leads to a result inconsistent
with the near universal view that a flat income tax does not violate the Takings Clause. 155
Using percent burdens avoids this difficulty, as the gross burden curve
for a flat-income tax is a horizontal line without such discontinuous jumps.
The next subsection, by marching through a series of applications, shows
that the percent CBP classifies a wide variety of governmental measures
just as existing takings law does.
Unfortunately, using percent burdens fails to eliminate one problem
faced by existing takings law: the so-called denominator problem. If one is
going to gauge burdens by percentages, one must choose a denominator by
which to divide the dollar burden imposed to reach a percent diminution.
This is a difficult problem with which courts continue to struggle. 156 For
income, the denominator is relatively uncontroversial: "[A]ll income from
whatever source derived," 157 less any deductions and credits permitted under the tax code. Similarly, a wealth tax, including all wealth, in whatever
form held, seems workable and relatively uncontroversial. For land, and
perhaps some forms of personal property, however, the denominator is less
clear. Does one include parcels adjacent to a condemned parcel owned by
the same person? This Article does not address the denominator problem;
rather, it imports without modification those standards that courts have developed to address the issue.
3. Applying the CBP.-This Article begins its study of the CBP by
drawing gross and net burden curves for the canonical case of a taking: state
expropriation of a single parcel of land. The choice between absolute and
percent burdens has no effect on the shape of either curve, so there is no
need to redraw them. The net burden curve shows, under plausible assumptions about the benefits of the government's use of the parcel, that there is a
huge jump-a discontinuity-in burdens between everyone else and the
owner of the taken parcel. As this is the canonical case of a taking, it is important, if not impressive, that the CBP deems this a taking requiring compensation. With proper compensation, the singled-out landowner is placed
on equal footing with everyone else, remedying the unconstitutional discontinuity that violated the CBP.
ISS It is possible that there will be many discontinuous jumps in income: the income of the second highest earner may be much higher than the third; or incomes might be continuous from the highest to the 22nd
highest, and then drop off discontinuously to the 23rd highest income.
6
IS The Supreme Court has not given definitive guidance on the denominator problem, and thus the
lower federal and state courts continue to struggle with the problem. See. e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d
413 (Mich. App. 1996). See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 11.7 (2d ed. 2001)
(ascertaining the "Takings Fraction" or "Relevant Parcel").
7
IS 26 U.S.C. § 6l(a) (2000) ("Gross income defined").
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FIGURE4

Net Burdens,
Taking of a Single House
With Compensation

0
Net Benefit/
Burden

Raising the gross burden curve by a fixed amount for each person factors in
the addition of benefits. In the case of the taking of a particular piece of
land, there is no natural way to calculate percent gains. Unlike the case of
the taxes considered immediately above, there is no natural base to use as
the denominator in calculating percent net burdens. Thus, there is not a
unique ordering of the net burdens imposed on each citizens. Thus, the use
of a flat line to model benefits is arbitrary. In studying the CBP, however,
one is not so much worried about the precise shapes of the burden curves as
with the existence of discontinuous jumps. For instance, it seems unlikely
that a new road confers discontinuous benefits on those whose property is
not taken for the project. Some landowners will benefit more than others,
such as those owning land close to an exit, but these benefits are likely to be
continuous, as the owner of land two-hundred feet from an intersection will
benefit less, but only slightly less, than the owner of property one-hundred
feet from the exit.
Next, consider the gross burdens curve for the two taxes I wish to distinguish. First, the "Bill Gates Tax" gross burden curve looks exactly like
the curve for the expropriation of a single parcel. The curve's similarity to
the expropriation of a single parcel captures the intuition that, if focused
narrowly enough, a tax looks like a classic example of a taking.
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Now consider the gross burden curve for a hypothetical progressive income tax bearing a rough similarity to the current U.S. personal income tax.
FIGURE6

Gross Burdens of
Progressive Income Tax

0

Gross
Burden

230

HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 230 2002-2003

97:189 (2002)

Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings

This graph reflects a tax, much like current taxation schemes, with an
exemption for the lowest earners. The curve depicts burdens for an income
tax with three marginal rates, with each rate applied to income above three
corresponding income levels. The actual percent burden on taxpayers subject to a given marginal rate is always less than that marginal rate, as they
pay lower rates on income below each threshold. By definition, the gross
burden curve orders taxpayers by income, from lowest to highest. The key
observation about this curve is that there are no discontinuities or jumps because burdens increase in small increments from the lowest earner to the
highest. Thus, before accounting for benefits, this gross burdens curve suggests that a prototypical progressive income tax is not a taking under the
CBP.
These gross burden curves, of course, do not account for the benefits
received by taxpayers under either tax. Calculating the benefits received
by each person is not possible. Beyond the number and complexity of
governmental expenditures, many of the goods provided by the state are
public goods that, in practice, are impossible to price. The phrase "public
good" is a technical term that requires some elaboration. The government
levies the income tax, in the main, to provide benefits to a large portion of
the citizenry in the form of goods and services, such as police, fire, and
military protection; roads, canals, ports, airports, and air traffic control;
and clean air. The list of such goods and services is endless. Many,
though not all, goods provided by the government are public goods, at
least in part. Public goods differ from private goods in two key respects.
First, their consumption is nonrivalrous: the fact that Anne "consumes"
police services every day does not generally diminish Betty's ability to
enjoy police protection. The same, however, cannot be said of a Big Mac.
Second, it is difficult or impossible to exclude anyone from consuming
the good or service. 158 Nonexclusivity makes it difficult to rely on private
parties to supply a good, because an inability to exclude makes it difficult
to charge anyone for the good. The state, if anyone, must provide such
goods.
But what apportionment of the cost of such public goods is fair? Unfortunately, there is no single theoretically pleasing and practically feasible
mechanism to determine a single general revenue tax that defmes how
much each citizen should contribute toward the cost of public goods. All
citizens, roughly, consume the same police services, the same military protection, and the same clean air.
The impossibility of charging each citizen a unique price for public
benefits undermines simpler assertions that various taxes violate the Takings Clause. As a critic of the first income tax's progressive rates rhetorically asked, "What sound reason, we inquire, can be brought forward for
158

RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY

8.

MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

41-45 (5th ed. 1989).
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treating the payment of taxes after a different manner than payment for
anything else that is received from the hands of the government-service
of the post, for example." 159 The post office lacks the attributes of a public good: consumption is rivalrous (if a mailperson delivers my mail, he
cannot deliver your mail at the same time) and exclusive (you cannot get
your letters delivered unless you pay postage). Thus, it makes sense for
the government to run the postal service on a fee-for-service basis. Yet,
there is no such pricing mechanism available to apportion the cost of true
public goods. Generally, then, benefits that accrue to individual citizens
from public programs are not amenable to exact definition.
That being said, there are three assumptions about the allocation of
benefits that provide baselines for determining the net burdens of a tax.
First, assume that all governmental projects benefit each person by the same
absolute amount. Under this assumption one can draw the net burdens
curves for the Bill Gates tax and for a progressive income tax:

FIGURE 7

Net Burdens,
Bill Gates Tax,
Equal Benefits

0

Net Benefit/
Burden

159

Hackett, supra note 99, at 440.
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FIGURE

8
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Equal Benefits

0
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Burden

In each case, the gross benefits curves shifted upward. The shift is not
equal for all points on the curve, as it would have been if one was measuring burdens/benefits in fixed dollars. Here, the curves represent percent
burdens/benefits and, hence, a dollar's worth of benefits or burdens has a
greater impact the further one goes to the left, as the base level of income
is decreasing in that direction. This shift has no effect on the continuity of
burdens between taxpayers, and accordingly, one's conclusions remain
unchanged under the assumption of equal benefits. The small benefit of
public programs to Bill Gates is swamped by the inordinate burden imposed, and, under the CBP, he still has a takings claim. Including benefits
in the progressive tax case does not single anyone out for much worse
treatment than their neighbor, and there remains no discontinuity that
would evidence a taking.
The second baseline assumption about benefits is that they increase
proportionately with wealth; this is the assumption made by advocates of
flat-rate taxation. The following two diagrams illustrate the net burden
curves for the two taxes under this assumption:
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FIGURE 9
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FIGURE

10
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Because these graphs add percent benefits to gross benefits as a percentage of income, the addition of benefits here simply lifts each curve by a
fixed amount. With benefits increasing as income increases, the discontinuous jump in the Bill Gates taxes shrinks and, under extreme assumptions, could disappear. In general, however, the gap between the net
burden on Bill Gates and the person with the next highest income will be
noticeable, as Gates alone is subject to the tax. Thus, the CBP suggests
that even if benefits increase with wealth, a tax on the wealthiest person
alone is still a taking. Similarly, factoring in benefits from a progressive
income tax under this assumption does not change the key features of the
curve. In other words, the difference in burden between any two taxpayers remains relatively small; accordingly, progressive income taxation is
not a taking under the CBP.
The third and final distribution of benefits considered here is the
possibility that public expenditures disproportionately benefit the
wealthy.

FIGURE 11
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FIGURE
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For the Bill Gates tax, benefits from governmental spending that increase
disproportionately with income translate into quickly rising benefits for
wealthier taxpayers, except for Gates. More so than in the previous examples
(Figures 9 and 10), benefits here cut into the burden imposed on him and him
alone. Still, unless benefits increase dramatically at higher incomes, there
will be a noticeable gap between the burden imposed on Gates and on the
next highest earner. Thus, even under an assumption very favorable to the
constitutionality of the tax, its discontinuous burdens violate the CBP.
For the progressive income tax, the curve is drawn under the assumption
that the disproportionately increasing benefits eventually outweigh increasing
marginal rates, which explains why the curve begins to move upward at the
highest incomes. It seems just as likely that this net burdens curve will slope
downward everywhere, the outcome if marginal tax rates more than offset the
rate at which benefits increase with income. In either case, however, the application of the CBP yields the same results as it did under the two previous
assumptions on the distribution of benefits: there are no discontinuous jumps
in the net benefits curve, and, hence, there is no taking.
Under each of these assumptions about the distribution of benefits,
then, the CBP validates the constitutionality of progressive income taxation
and conversely suggests that the Bill Gates tax is a taking. Although these
results might not always hold, they do seem robust to quite a wide variety
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of assumptions about the distribution of benefits from government projects.
This stands in stark contrast to the argument that anything but a flat-rate income tax is unconstitutional, which assumes that the benefits from government programs increase precisely in proportion with income. Given the
impossibility of calculating how much governmental expenditures benefit
persons across income or other independent variables, like wealth, the need
to make such an assumption renders the case for strictly proportionate taxation brittle. The case for flat-rate taxation stands or falls with a dubious assumption. The results of applying the CBP, however, are robust: they
survive under a wide variety of assumptions about the distribution of
benefits from governmental expenditures.
In one sense, the Bill Gates tax can be thought of as an extreme case of
progressive taxation. Yet, it is important to realize how such a tax, as illustrated above, differs radically from the structure and practice of income
taxation in America. Income tax rules in the United States have always allowed all potential taxpayers to claim exemptions. To do otherwise creates
bizarre incentives. For example, if a 50% tax has a $100,000 exemption,
but those making over $100,000 were not entitled to the exemption, someone making $100,001 would pay $50,000.50 in taxes, reducing their aftertax income far below those making $99,000. Taxpayers would respond in a
wide variety of ways to such a peculiar system; if nothing else, they would
simply refuse compensation over $100,000. 160 Paying $50,000 in taxes on
the marginal dollar of income at $100,000 is precisely the kind of discontinuous jump in liability that the CBP deems a taking.
Avoiding such an absurd tax regime, while allowing all taxpayers to
avail themselves of exemptions, makes it extremely difficult to burden one
person or one group heavily while leaving all others untouched. For example, assume that Bill Gates is the only person with an income over $1 billion. The obvious way to limit the tax's application to him is to set the
exemption level at $1 billion. Yet, this tax will only impose a discontinuous burden on Gates if his income is much higher than $1 billion. If his income is $1 billion and one, he would pay at most $1 more in tax than the
next highest earner. If his income is $2 billion, he would bear a discontinuous burden. Such examples demonstrate that a top marginal tax rate that
applies to only one or a few individuals will violate the CBP if there is a
discontinuous jump between these top incomes and those of everyone else.
Under these assumptions, a progressive income tax with a top rate that affects one or a handful of individuals does, in fact, single these individuals
for a unique burden: they pay a tax rate on a significant portion of their
income not felt by anyone else.

160
This is not strictly true. Even without the exemption, those with incomes above $200,000 would be
better off accepting the compensation.
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A similar discontinuity occurs if the highest marginal rate applies to a handful of taxpayers in addition to Gates, but they are all clustered in the very
low end of the tax bracket. In order to avoid such discontinuities and comply with the CBP, the highest marginal tax rate must apply to a significant
number of taxpayers, some of whose income extends past the lower bound
of the rate, where the effective tax rate increases most rapidly. 161

4. Applying the CBP to Other Taxes and the Draft.-The progressive
taxation of estates and inheritances, by both state and federal government, predates enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment; moreover, the Supreme Court
repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to these taxes} 62 The Supreme
Court's justification for such taxes, however, is very formal, and, well, unAmerican. As the Court declared in Magoun v. fl/inois Trust & Savings Bank,
"[t]he right to take property by devise or descent is a creature of the law, and
not a natural right-a privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it
may impose conditions upon it." 163 There is no doubt that this holding reflects
161
Note that the federal income tax during the Civil War, despite its very high exemptions, still
reached thousands of citizens. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
162
Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding progressive state inheritance
tax); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding progressive federal inheritance tax); New York
Trust v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (upholding progressive federal estate tax). An inheritance tax is
levied on recipients individually; an estate tax is levied on the decedent's property before distribution.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550,783 (6th ed. 1990).
163
Magoun, 170 U.S. at 288.
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the law of England during the founding era. 164 The rule, however, is rooted in
feudalism and the existence of a single overlord. Locke, a primary source of
property theory for the founding generation, explicitly rejected the notion that
inheritance existed at the pleasure of the king or queen: "Every man is born
with ... a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father's
goods." 165 And at least one state court explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Magoun as inimical to American property ideology:
That element of unadaptability under our conception of inherent rights in place
of privileges by grace was hardly understood when the idea took root which obtained quite generally for a century after our American system was established,
that there is no natural right to inherit ... which this court has seen fit to reject as
heresies, viewed from the standpoint of our conception of such rights. 166

Thus, the Supreme Court's doctrinal justification for progressive estate
taxes is questionable. The CBP, however, provides a much firmer defense of
progressive estate taxation. For all but extreme cases, where the exemption
levels are so high that they impact one or only a few taxpayers, the burdens of
the tax are still continuous under the CBP because even those paying the tax
get the benefit of the fairly high, but not extraordinarily high, exemption. 167
A general sales (excise) tax on all goods is the primary alternative to the
income tax (or a wealth tax) as a practical source of revenue sufficient to meet
the needs of the modern state. The fundamental difference between a sales tax
and an income tax is that a sales tax reaches only consumption; it leaves savings untaxed. For the purpose of applying the CBP, however, the key point is
that, in practice, sales taxes are almost always assessed at a single rate; accordingly, there is no possibility for a discontinuous jump in percent burdens
on consumption. Given a flat rate, sales taxation clearly satisfies the CBP.
One common objection to a sales tax is that it is effectively regressive in
income: since savings, which escapes taxation, increase rapidly with income,
the wealthy pay much less sales tax, as a proportion of income, than the poor.
One would then expect that scholars who argue that any deviation from strictly
proportional taxation would oppose a general sales tax, but I could not uncover
a single article making this argument. Indeed, Epstein maintains that a general
164
Blackstone was clear that there was no natural right to inherit under English law; it was permitted at the pleasure of the sovereign: "Wills therefore and testaments, rights of inheritance and succession, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects regulated
by them ...." 2 SiR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 479 (William
Draper Lewis ed., 1900). Justice Story said the same rule held in America: "Nothing, therefore, can be
clearer than that the rules of descent are subject to be changed by legislative authority." 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 670 (1833).
165
JOHN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT§ 190 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1980) (1690), available at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/academic/digitextsllocke/secondllocke2nd.txt.
166
Owen v. Donald, !51 N.W. 331,367 (Wis. 1915).
167
In this and the following example, one assumes equal benefits from the expenditure of the estate
tax. As with the income tax, this assumption is not critical; our results are robust to a very wide variety of
assumptions about the distribution of benefits from the expenditure of this general revenue tax.
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sales tax is permissible. 168 Perhapf. Epstein's argument is that a sales tax is
strictly proportional to its base, which is essentially purchases, as a flat-rate income tax is strictly proportional to its base, which is income. This argument,
however, admits that the strict proportionality requirement is quite manipulable
based on the choice of a tax base. A flat-rate tax on wealth, for example, would
likely mimic a progressive income tax. 169 Would advocates of flat-rate income
taxation permit this end-run around their strict proportionality requirement?
One common means of mitigating the regressivity of a general sales tax is
to exempt ''necessities" like food and rent from the tax. The rationale behind
such exemptions rests on the generally acknowledged fact that the poor spend a
larger portion of their income than the wealthy on these items. Accordingly,
exempting these items lightens the burden of taxation from the poor. An extreme version of this practice is so-called luxury taxation, which is an excise tax
levied on a relatively small set of goods, like yachts and expensive jewelry consumed largely by the wealthy. Epstein argues that such luxury taxes, as well as
all narrowly based sales taxes, impose disproportionate burdens and, hence, are
unconstitutional. He cites two examples in support of his argument. First, in
Rossmiller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a statute that declared
all ice on lakes state property and that imposed an excise tax on the ice extractors. 170 The court reasoned that the statute destroyed citizens' preexisting profits aprendre 171 to remove ice. Epstein defends the court's holding, noting that
the tax imposed disproportionate burdens on certain citizens, like the plaintiff
who had made investments in ice removal before passage of the statute. 172
Second, Epstein attacked Montana's severance tax 173 on coal, arguing that it
reduces the value of Montana coal owners' property. He generalizes from such
cases to argue that any nongeneral sales tax will impose disproportionate burdens on sellers of the taxed item(s). 174
Epstein, however, makes some important exceptions to his rule requiring a
sales tax to reach all goods. He states that the government may impose excise
taxes on goods that have negative external effects on other property owners,
such as nuisances, without paying compensation. In addition, he argues that
the government may limit the use of a scarce resource by imposing a tax on an
activity affecting the availability of the resource, like fishing for a depleted species. These exceptions Epstein notes are in keeping with accepted doctrine
that nuisance regulation and solutions to common pool problems are among

168

EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94.
See generally Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 140.
170
Rossmiller v. State, 89 N.W. 839 (Wis. 1902).
171
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (6th ed. 1990) (defining profit<\ prendre).
172
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 223-24.
173
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981 ). Severance is just a fancy name for
an excise tax, supposedly assessed at the instant the coal is severed from the earth by mining.
174
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94.
169
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the primary purposes of state regulation and thus not considered takings. 175
Even acknowledging such justifications for these exceptions, there are
some problems with Epstein's argument that specific excise taxes are takings.
The first is the complex issue of tax incidence, namely who ultimately bears
the burden of a levy. Just because consumers nominally pay a sales tax at the
time of purchase does not mean that they bear the entire burden of the tax, or
indeed any of it. Incidence is complex and depends on the shapes, and in particular the elasticities, of the demand and supply curves. 176 Epstein seems to
assume that the incidence is on the suppliers alone. If, however, the tax falls
mainly on purchasers and the group of such purchasers form a high proportion of the population in the jurisdiction, there is no disproportionate burden
imposed on anyone, and thus no violation of the CBP.
Another problem with Epstein's opposition to narrowly targeted sales
taxation is that, like his opposition to progressive taxation, it is inconsistent
with both longstanding historical practice and judicial doctrine. The founding
generation singled out carriages, which were a luxury item, for taxation. In
addition, the nation imposed tariffs asymmetrically throughout the 1800s,
leaving some imports untaxed, others taxed lightly, and yet others taxed heavily.177 The courts have given states broad latitude in selecting the targets of
taxation. In Dane v. Jackson, 178 for instance, the Supreme Court held that a
Massachusetts tax on income from intangible property was constitutional despite its admitted effect of transferring tax revenue from some localities to
others. Here, the Court clearly deferred to legislative tax base selections:
[S]ince the system of taxation has not yet been devised which will retwn precisely
the same measure ofbenefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers, in proportion to
payment made, as will be retwned to ever; other individual or class paying a given
tax, it is not within either the disposition or power of this court to revise the necessarily complicated taxing systems of the States for the purpose of attempting to
produce what might be thought to be a more just distribution of the burdens of
taxation than that arrived at by the state Legislatures . .. .179

175
Though Epstein believes that taxation of those imposing costs on society is a not a taking, he
would limit the application of this rule. For example, he disagrees with the holding in City of Pittsburgh
v. ALCO Parking Corp., 417 U.S . 369 (1974 ), where the Court upheld a 20% tax on private parking lots
against a due process challenge. The Supreme Court upheld the tax based in large part on the City's justification: the tax was designed to charge suburbanites for the use of city roads. /d.; see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 5, at 140-43. Epstein argues that the tax was seriously overinclusive, maintaining that taxes
on those imposing costs must be narrowly tailored. Under Epstein ' s standard, it is not clear that federal
and state gasoline taxes are legal. This is a worrisome result; although they are not perfect, gasoline
taxes are an administratively inexpensive way to internalize the congestion, road wear, and pollution
costs imposed by vehicles. Practically speaking, there may be no better alternative.
176
MUSGRAVE&MUSGRAVE,supranote 158,atch.l5.
177
See supra note 76 (discussing Carriage Tax); STANLEY, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing asymmetry of tariffs).
178
256 u.s. 589(1921).
179
/d. at 598-99.

241

HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 241 2002-2003

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In his treatise, written during this classical period, Cooley concurred with
the Court: "The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has been
prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in its discretion the
subjects of taxation." 18 Cooley denied that state constitutional provisions decreeing unifonnity in taxation limited the legislature's choice of a tax base-a
clause facially much more on point than general takings provisions.
As it did with income taxation, the CBP helps distinguish cases in which
courts accepted and rejected challenges to specific excise taxes. Consider, for
example, the Rossmiller and Dane decisions. Dane's tax on income from intangibles undoubtedly impacted a broad range of the citizenry, whose intangible property ranged in value from almost nothing to very large amounts.
Accordingly, the burden curve for the tax was smooth and did not violate the
CBP. Conversely, harvesting ice likely involved relatively few producers, so
imposing the tax on their product, questions of incidence aside, imposed relatively heavy burdens on a small group. Thus, the CBP suggests that Epstein
was correct in adjudging the selective tax on ice removal a taking.
As a final application of the CBP to general revenue tax, which is a tax
that benefits most citizens, consider the military draft. Others have noted that
the draft, in many respects, looks like a taking. 181 Its net burden curve bears
this out:

°

FIGURE 14
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° COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 632.
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BLUM & I<ALVEN,JR., supra

note 9, at 7...S; Fischel, supra note 73, at24-28.
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Here, the curve has been drawn under the baseline assumption that all citizens benefit equally from the services performed by the conscripted military. The downward slope of the curve among draftees reflects the differing
opportunity costs to the draftees, such as the relinquishment of privatesector wages. The steep jump in net burden between those drafted and everyone else violates the CBP. 182
There is little if any doubt, however, that as a matter of current law the
draft is not a taking that requires compensation. It thus represents the first
example of a measure that violates the CBP yet is not, and has never been,
ruled a compensable taking. That said, recognition of the heavy burden imposed by the draft has led legislatures to confer special benefits on soldiers
more than once. The post-WWII "GI" bill and veterans' hospitals are two recent examples. Consider, also, Booth v. Town ofWoodbury, 183 a splendid example from the Civil War. The Town of Woodbury, relying on a state
statute, passed an ordinance raising, by general taxation, $200 for each of the
thirty-two soldiers that made up the town's quota under the national draft law.
The would-be soldiers could either use the $200 to hire a replacement, or
serve in the Union army and take the sum as a "bounty." 184 Some non-draftee
taxpayers challenged this additional tax. Counsel for the town, in response to
this challenge, directed the court's attention to the allocation ofbenefits:
It was for the conunon benefit of the inhabitants of Woodbury that the town

quota should be filled, and that conunon benefit justifies a general taxation.
The conunon welfare of the town might demand that substitutes should be
hired for drafted men, who would serve the government equally well, and
leave good farmers and good mechanics at their labor. The town could better
afford to pay the money than lose the men, and the government is in either
case equally assisted. 185

He then contrasted this broad allocation of benefits with the draft's narrow burdens:
Is it in opposition to natural right and justice that property, three quarters of
which is probably in the hands of persons not liable to a draft, should bear its
182
Fischel, supra note 73 (arguing that the draft is only a taking when the nation drafts a small percentage of its citizens). This Article will reach the same result-that burdens placed on majorities are almost never takings-but the reasoning here will differ. Fischel, inter alia, borrows Michelman's
"demoralization" model, see discussion supra Part II.C, and argues that (i) marginal demoralization costs
fall as the percent of the citizenry drafted increases and (ii) marginal settlement costs increase as the state
must impose more and more taxes, and thus deadweight losses, to compensate the draftees. Fischel, supra
note 73. The problem with this model is that at some point marginal settlement costs begin to fall: as the
size of the group drafted approaches 100%, the group itself appropriates all the benefits of its efforts, and
these implicit benefits begin to obviate the need for explicit compensation. In the limit, everyone fights to
save the nation, and there is no point to taxing everyone just to write each a check equal to their tax bill.
183
32Conn.118(1864).
184
Fischel, supra note 73, at 48 (citing "filE DRAFT AND ITS ENEMIES 57-58 (John O'Sullivan & Alan
M. Mecklereds., 1974)).
185
Booth, 32 Conn. at 122-23.
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fair share of the burden of the present exigency? Those over forty-five years
of age have an equal interest in the stability of our institutions. The drafted
man pays his share of all taxes, and in addition, whichever of the legal alternatives he chooses, service, either personal, by substitute, or the commutation. Is
it unjust that this extra burden should be assumed by all, and the entire community be permitted to pay what the great majority esteem it a privilege to
pay? It is not taxing A to put money into the pocket of B; it is taxing ~11 to
meet the requirements of a peremptory law. 186
Based on these arguments, the court rejected an explicit takings challenge
to the town ordinance, ruling that this was a tax exacting from each taxpayer
"their share of a justly imposed and apportioned general public burthen, and the
equivalent is presumptively received in the benefits conferred by the govemment."187 In addition, the court noted that the state could impose a "serve or
pay" obligation on all citizens, instead of just younger men, and that the municipal tax measure imposed a lesser burden on non-draftees.
To summarize, the CBP holds most forms of general taxationtaxation applied to projects benefiting a broad class of the communityimmune from takings challenges. There are, as just acknowledged, a few
exceptions to this immunity, namely the Bill Gates tax or a narrowly focused sales tax. These exceptions, however, are consistent with the current,
and long-standing, understanding of the legislature's broad powers to
choose a particular mode of taxation. As Cooley noted,
No system of taxation has yet been devised which will return precisely the
same measure of benefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers in proportion to
payment made, as will be returned to every other individual or class paying a
given tax; and it follows that neither the federal nor state courts have power to
revise the taxing system of a state for the purpose of attempting to produce a
more just distribution of the burdens of taxation than that arrived at by the legislature. A state tax law will be held to conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment "only where it proposes, or clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable
inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount
to the arbitrary taking of property without compensation-'to spoliation under
the guise of exerting the power of taxation."' 188
One straightforward way to interpret Cooley's phrase "flagrant and
palpable inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit received,"189 which is the point at which the Supreme Court says that taxation
can amount to an "arbitrary taking," 190 is as a violation of the CBP. A
large, discontinuous jump in the net burden curve for a tax corresponds well
with such language.
186
187
188
189
190

/d. at 123-24.
/d. at 130.

COOLEY, supra note 52, at 216 (citing Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921 )).
See id.
Dane, 256 U.S. at 599.
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Applying the CBP to Zoning and Other Forms of Regulation .-

Although this Article has developed the CBP as a means to draw the line
between taxation and takings, this subpart, and the following subpart IV.B,
endeavor to demonstrate that the CBP operates under a general principle
embedded in takings law. This section applies the CBP to zoning and other
common forms of regulation; subpart IV.B fits the principle into the
broader framework of the Supreme Court's existing takings jurisprudence.
As an example, zoning both benefits and burdens restricted parcels. It
benefits each owner by limiting neighbors' land use, but burdens each
owner with roughly symmetric restrictions. Ideally, these benefits and burdens would make every landoWner better off, but in practice that is rare.
Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Greenacre, a semi-rural
area, fifteen miles from any shopping venue, is zoned entirely singlefamily, and is fully developed. Brownacre, directly across a major road
from Greenacre, was unimproved and unzoned until new legislation limited
it to single-family use. This zoning will sharply reduce the value of parcels
in Brownacre that border Greenacre: the parcels' closeness to Greenacre,
along with their close proximity to a major road, made them ideal locations
to satisfy Greenacre' s commercial needs. The farther one travels into
Brownacre, however, the smaller the value of such land-use opportunities.
Indeed, at some point, one presumes the benefits of restricting neighbors
will exceed the burdens on a particular owner. 191
Under Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the zoning of Brownacre is undoubtedly
constitutional. Those who believe that progressive taxation is a taking naturally
argue that so too is such zoning. In both cases, net burdens are not strictly proportional because the "reciprocal benefits" of zoning do not offset, even
roughly, disproportionate diminutions in value imposed on those in Brownacre
who own land across the street from Greenacre. As Epstein argues,
unless all land in the area is subject to the restriction, there is still an enormous
disproportionate impact. ... The restrictive rules are a government-sponsored
restraint of trade. [I]t is immaterial that the owners "share" in the benefits of
the [zoning ordinance]. The issue is the extent of benefits they receive. . . . A
nickel's compensation will not discharge a hundred dollar obligation. To treat
the mere existence of some benefits as an adequate measure of their value is to
indulge in a conclusive presumption that is known to be wrong . ... 192

The result under the CBP, on the other hand, dovetails with existing law
and would hold such zoning constitutional. The burdens in Brownacre look
almost exactly like a progressive income tax, with burdens increasing as one
gets closer to Greenacre, where opportunities for retailing are more attractive.
If one thinks of parcels as the base for this "zoning tax," then there are no large

191
The Article discusses the unusual case oflaws for which burdens exceed benefits for everyone infra
Part IV.C.
192
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 273.
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jumps in the tax rate, and thus under the CBP, there is no taking.
Although generally valid, zoning, like taxation, can cross the line, violate
the CBP, and amount to a taking whenever it burdens certain landowners much
more than their neighbors. So-called "reverse spot zoning," for example,
occurs when a zoning ordinance prevents a property owner from utilizing his
or her property in a certain way, when virtually all of the adjoining neighbors
are not subject to such a restriction, creating, in effect, a veritable zoning island or zoning peninsula in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification.
Reverse spot zoning is invalid, as it is confiscatory. 193

More generally, the Supreme Court has found zoning a taking where, even
though contemplated for general application, the zoning applies only to one
parcel. 194
General economic legislation, like zoning, is presumptively valid but
such measures may transgress the Takings Clause in extreme cases. For example, the liability for coal miners' health costs at issue in Eastern Enterprises195 was such an extreme case. Although the author disagreed with the
Court's grounds for distinguishing taxes from takings, the result in Eastern
Enterprises is entirely consistent with the CBP. The statute struck down by
the Court attempted to impose a significant fraction of the unexpected health
costs of former miners on an entity with tenuous ties to the mining industry,
in general, and the sick miners, in particular. The difference in the burden
imposed on Eastern Enterprises and every other segment of society with similarly loose ties to the miners was huge and there was no justification for this
deviation from the CBP. The Eastern Enterprises opinion vindicated Richard
Epstein's contention that the Black Lung Compensation Program, similar in
many respects to the legislation struck down in Eastern Enterprises, was a
taking. His argument was quite similar to the logic of the Eastern Enterprises Court: taxing new mine owners for the health expenses of miners that
they never employed, and concentrating the burden of those expenses on a
"narrow segment" of the population, violated the CBP. 196
The coal industry also supplied, arguably, the most important takings case
the Supreme Court ever decided, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 197 The
193

City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The label "reverse spot zoning" was derived from the term "spot zoning," where a landowner is singled out for favorable
treatment (as opposed to unfavorable treatment in cases of reverse spot zoning). See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW§ 6.37 (Lexis Law Publ'g, 4th ed. 1997) (1982).
194
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In general, as the hypothetical with Greenacre
and Brownacre showed, this is not so. More difficult to explain is their assertion that inflation focuses burdens narrowly. !d. Under the likely assumption that there is a continuum from large-magnitude creditors,
to those who are neither borrowers nor lenders, to large-magnitude debtors, inflation has a continuum of
effects: from great harm to large creditors to great benefit to large debtors (the converse applies for deflation). Thus, under the CBP, it is quite difficult to paint inflation or deflation as a taking.
195
524
498 (1998).
196
Epstein, supra note 49, at 442.
197
260
393 (1922).

u.s.

u.s.
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Court's holding is also consistent with the CBP. Mahon involved a Pennsylvania statute barring mining companies from the removal of coal pillars that
might cause the surface to subside, despite the fact that the mining company
had specifically bargained for the right to cause such subsidence. 198 In an oftquoted passage, the Court held that the diminution in value to the mining company's property rights went "too far." 199 This Article will return to the Court's
diminution test in the next section. For present purposes, however, it is clear
that the CBP provides an alternative ground for the finding that the Pennsylvania statute effected a taking: under the plausible assumption that few owners' land contained significant coal pillars, the statute simulated a narrowly
focused excise tax, concentrating burdens on a small group.

B. The Continuous Marginal Burdens Principle and Current
Takings Doctrine
Although the CBP is thus consistent with the outcome of Mahon, it is
not consistent with its so-called diminution test, which is the idea that a
regulation or other government act that destroys more than some percent of
property values is a taking. As explained and illustrated above, the CBP
calls for a relative, contextual comparison, attempting to determine if a
plaintiffs burden significantly exceeds the imposition on the next most
burdened person. This is in stark contrast to the absolute, context-free
diminution test currently employed by the Supreme Court.
Although Supreme Court takings doctrine is not entirely clear, it appears
that the Court has refined Mahon's diminution test for regulatory takings
cases into a three-pronged test first applied in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York. This test considers (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the character of the
government action." 200 The last prong of the test seems to refer to per se
rules for specific types of governmental conduct, such as physical invasions,
regulating nuisances, and destructions of all value.
One can think of the CBP as a concrete rule to operationalize the vague
first and second prongs of the Penn Central test, regarding "economic impact" and "interference with investment-backed expectations." First, the
CBP captures the economic impact of a regulation on property owners.
Second, investment-backed expectations fit CBP-friendly cases like
Rossmiller,201 in which regulation will impact a small group of property
owners who have made investments in an activity that has been narrowly
targeted for taxation or other forms of regulation.
The majority opinion in Penn Central, however, indicates that the
198
199
200
201

/d. at412-13 .
/d. at 414-15 .
438 u.s. 104, 124 (1978).
89 N.W. 839 (Wise. 1902).
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Court did not read its first two prongs in a manner consistent with the CBP.
The opinion rejected Penn Central Railroad's takings challenge to New
York City landmarks preservation laws, which prevented it from building a
skyscraper on top of Grand Central Station. Under the CBP, landmarks
preservation laws are quite likely takings. Those owning landmarks, a relatively small group, bear the entire burden of satisfying a society-wide desire
to preserve noteworthy buildings and sites. The majority admitted that the
landmark laws reached only four hundred buildings and thirty-one small
districts in New York. 202 The dissent, however, gives a statistic much more
relevant for applying the CBP: the regulations affected only 0.04% of
landowners in the City. 203 Ignoring the relevant tax base, Justice Brennan's
majority opinion explicitly denied that New York's landmark preservation
laws were "like discriminatory, or 'reverse spot' zoning .... [T]he New
York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city."204 Despite the new three-prong veneer, the Penn Central Court seems to have
simply applied Mahon's diminution test: the railroad suffered, but it still
could earn a "fair return" on Grand Central Station, and hence did not suffer
a diminution severe enough to trigger compensation.
Similar reasoning in Andrus v. Allard2°5 led to another decision at odds
with the CBP?s approach to the first two arms of the Penn Central test. In
Allard, the Court held that a statute banning the sale of eagle feathers did
not amount to a taking of the property of those owning such feathers. Although the statute did destroy the right-to-alienate "stick" in the bundle of
property rights, the Court determined that it was "crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds. " 206 The Court, in all seriousness, suggested that
eagle feather artifact owners could generate income by displaying the items
and charging admission. It is extraordinarily doubtful that the income generated by such viewings would even approach the feathers' retail sale value.
For example, witness the ratio of sales to display income for collectibles in
general, such as stamps, coins, and autographs. The statute banning sales of
eagle feathers likely does reduce illegal poaching of the endangered eagles,
but the law imposed most of the costs of this measure on a very small group
of dealers in eagle feather artifacts. 207
202
203
204

Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132.
!d. at 138 n.l.
!d. at 132.

u.s. 51 (1979).

205

444

206

/d. at 66.

207
One might argue that the statute in Allard imposed a continuum of burdens, because ownership of eagle feather artifacts probably form a continuum: many own none, many own a few, many own a few more
than a few, etc., up to the largest owners. Each artifact, however, is a discrete property right, just as each parcel
of land is a discrete unit for takings analysis. This is but another manifestation of the difficult "denominator''
problem of takings law discussed at supra text accompanying notes 144-45. Though the CBP does not solve
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The third prong of Penn Central, regarding "the character of the government action," seems to refer to three per se rules. First, the government need
not pay compensation when regulation of a nuisance reduces a property's
value. Property rights generally do not include the right to impose costs on
neighbors, and the CBP has no application in such cases in which owners enjoined from maintaining nuisances simply bear no compensable burden.
Second, if the character of the government action involves any sort of
physical invasion, there is a taking and the state must pay compensation. 208 A
number of commentators have attacked this rule as being excessively formal
and as lacking any policy justification. 209 It is inconsistent with the CBP, because it compensates in cases where burdens are small and continuous. The
outcome of Loretto illustrates the futility of the rule and its disconnect with the
Armstrong principle regarding unfair burdens. After all, the plaintiff landlords
collected $1 in compensation for being obligated, under state law, to suffer the
presence of cable TV wiring and switching boxes on their premises.
Third, under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, government measures that destroy "all economically viable use" of property are takings. 210 Here,
regulation designed to prevent beach erosion barred Lucas from building anything on two beachfront parcels. The Supreme Court held that the state had to
compensate Lucas for such a complete ban on improving his tracts. The CBP
might concur with the outcome of the case, if not the reasoning. South Carolina's scheme to prevent beach erosion may well have harmed Lucas and a
small handful of other owners of beachfront property far more than others; if
so, there was a taking under the CBP. Yet, as noted repeatedly above, the CBP
requires significant empirical fmdings about the class of burdened owners. In
general, the Lucas rule is not consistent with the CBP; it is permissible to burden some owners, say 100% of the value of some parcel, if another is burdened
by 99%, another by 98%, and so on, in small, continuous steps, all the way up
to the parties burdened least by the regulation. 211
the denominator problem, the problem poses no greater problem for it than for other theories about defining
takings.
208
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
209
Frank Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1621 n.105 (1988); Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1630, 1650 (1988); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem
ofTakings, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 591,661 (1998).
210
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225,260 (1980)).
211
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Lucas, stressed that the generality of the statute-the fact that it applied to all of the numerous beachfront property owners along South Carolina's shore-weighed heavily
against the majority's determination that a taking likely occurred. /d. at 1074. Although the concept of
"general application" has some overlap with the CBP, Stevens focuses on geographic generality. The CBP
focuses on generality of economic impact. Responding to Stevens's use of generality in his majority opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "a regulation specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by
plundering landowners generally than does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire immunity by prohibiting all religions." Id. at 1027 n.l4. Whether this statement is at odds with the CBP depends
on the meaning of the phrase "plundering landowners generally."
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C. Normative Foundations for the CBP
Thus far, the discussion and defense of the CBP has been almost entirely doctrinal. Specifically, the CBP has been shown to be consistent with
the "no unfair burdens" principle from Armstrong. Moreover, the CBP
provides a coherent guide for drawing the line between takings and taxation
and it is consistent with much, though not all, of the existing body of takings case law.
This subpart offers grounds for supporting the CBP as sound social
policy. The normative case for the CBP is a political one: the CBP places a
significant obstacle in the path of any majority block of voters attempting to
redistribute wealth from the remaining minority by imposing an "unfair"
portion of public burdens on them. The CBP, then, is a means to achieve
the ends articulated in Armstrong: "[T]o bar [the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."212
For illustration, consider the simplest example of unfair burdens in
public measures: naked redistribution from a minority to a majority that divides society into two markedly divergent camps. Here is a generic net
burden curve for such a maneuver:

FIGURE

15

Net Burdens,
Purely Redistrlbutionary Measure

Net Benefit!
Burden
g

A

0

212

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
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Pure redistribution adds a significant structural constraint on the net
burden curve. If one plotted absolute dollar benefits and burdens, area
A would equal the dollar amount paid to winners and area B would
equal the dollar amount paid by losers.213 Because net burden curves
show percents instead of absolute dollar amounts, the relationship is not
quite so simple and it will depend on the distribution of income, wealth,
or whatever comprises the tax base. Still, there will be a fixed mathematical relationship between the winners (area A) and the losers (area
B). If one thinks of a redistributive income tax, with grants to the less
wealthy (individuals A in group A) of g% of income, and a flat tax oft%
on a wealthy minority (individuals B in group B), then the following accounting identity must hold:

_Lg * Income(a) =

~)*Income( b)

aeA

beB

Put into words, this equation states that the sum of cash payments to
winners must equal the sum of taxes levied on the losers. The important
point is that, although the areas A and B are not equal, there is a fixed
relationship between them determined by the distribution of income or
other tax base, along with the grant and tax rates. This zero-sum nature
of redistribution, as will be demonstrated, makes it difficult for stark
"us-them" redistributive laws to satisfy the CBP. 214
The example graphed above obviously violates the CBP. However,
to come into compliance with the CBP given the budget constraint,
while still channeling some wealth from the minority, the majority can
(i) reduce the size of their coalition and (ii) make both benefits and burdens vary somewhat with the tax base. Adopting moderate versions of
both of these measures yields a net burden curve that looks something
like the Figure 16 on the next page. The curve in Figure 16 still violates
the CBP. Although shrinking the majority coalition and gradating benefits and burdens reduces the "jump" between the last member of the majority and the first member of the minority, a noticeable discontinuity
remains.

213

To the extent that redistribution involves administrative and transactions costs, it is a negative sum
game. This will make it even more difficult than suggested by these examples to assemble a coalition to
implement redistribution .
214
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between us/them, majority/minority dichotomies
and payment of compensation, see Carol M. Rose, Property & Expropriation: Themes and Variations in
American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REv. I.
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FIGURE 16

Net Burdens,
Modified Redistributionary Measure

Net Benefit/
Burden

0

A
!

B

If the majority continues with both tactics, namely decreasing the size
of the majority that is redistributing wealth from the minority and making
gradations in benefits and burdens, it will end up with a perfectly straight
line, without any ')umps," that satisfies the CBP.
FIGURE 17

Net Burdens,
Redistribution Satisfying the
CMBP
Net Benefit/
Burden

0
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In political terms, however, it will be difficult to muster a vote for such
a tax proposal because the measure no longer enjoys majority support. In
other words, the size of the benefiting coalition shrinks so much that the
median voter no longer reaps any benefits and has little reason to support
the measure. This series of examples, therefore, demonstrates that the CBP
places pressure on redistributionary coalitions to shrink their size and to tier
benefits and burdens. 215
The CBP, however, does not make redistribution entirely illegal; for
instance, the example in Figure 17 and the progressive taxation examples discussed above may be redistributionary, depending on the assumptions made about how the benefits of government increase with
income/wealth. The CBP does, nonetheless, place significant limits on
any majority coalition's ability to redistribute. Since redistribution
likely has some undesirable effects, such as reducing incentives for productive behavior and encouraging socially wasteful rent-seeking (e.g.,
resources spent on forming and maintaining a coalition to enact the
measure), the CBP is normatively desirable for efficiency reasons. Undoubtedly, the appeal of this partial curb on redistribution as a matter of
social justice is controversial, given divergent notions about inequality,
fairness, and justice. 216
It is, in fact, possible for a willing majority coalition to redistribute
wealth to the minority. Many current social programs do precisely this.
Moreover, the courts have long deemed permissible such redistribution,
at least for some purposes. "[G]ifts to unfortunate classes of society, as
the indigent blind, the deaf and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular
colleges or schools, or grants of pensions, swords or other mementoes
for past services, involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are frequently made and never questioned." 217 Thus, there is no
general constitutional barrier to legal measures that redistribute income
via taxes, expenditures, and transfer payments.

215
Some taxes may mix redistribution with other motivations. Tariffs, discussed in more detail at infra
Part VI, were the primary source of national government revenue until the I 900s and so might be classified
as a general revenue tax. Yet they had another purpose: protecting domestic enterprise from foreign competition. Foreign competition is not a nuisance. It is possible, however, that protecting domestic industries
is a privileged legislative purpose. If so, the courts should not review tariffs under the Takings Clause. On
the other hand, tariffs often impose severe burdens on a relatively small group of citizens (e.g., domestic
importers) to achieve a public "good" (e.g., fostering homegrown industry) which may justify Takings
Clause review. This is simply another difficult issue in drawing the line between legitimate exercises of the
states' police power requiring no compensation and government measures that go too far and amount to a
taking.
216
The leading modem defense of redistribution is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed.
1999); the most thorough reply to Rawls is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
217
Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 130 (1864).
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The resulting net burden curve for such redistributions may have two
sorts of discontinuities. First, there may be a jump between the leastbenefited minority member and the least-burdened majority member.
FIGURE 18

Net Burdens,
Redistribution to Minority,
Jump: Benefits to Burdens
Ner Benefirl
Burden

0

Although such a redistribution measure facially violates the CBP, normatively it is not troubling because it is self-imposed: the majority has
agreed to redistribute some of its wealth to the minority. The solution
for unhappy members of the majority is not constitutional; it is political.
They merely have to convince their too-generous cohorts in the wealthier group B to reverse the charitable policy. This solution, however,
may not always work because other members of the majority may feel
charitable toward the minority and, in effect, form a coalition with the
minority to their own pecuniary detriment.
What the CBP does forbid is targeting a subset of the majority for a
distinctly heightened burden. Figure 19 depicts a social subsidy program for a minority that its beneficiaries and a portion of the majority
support, thus imposing the costs of the program on other nonbeneficiaries. Those in the majority supporting the program bear a modest burden,
while placing most of the burden on others. This differs little in substance from simple redistribution, and the CBP's limit on such legislation, as discussed above, is desirable for efficiency reasons.
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19

Net Burdens,
Redistribution to Minority,
Jump: Among Burdened
Net Benefit/
Burden

0

The limiting cases of social programs that benefit only a minority are
measures that burden everyone. Under a popularly elected government, one
suspects that there must be some unaccounted-for benefit to explain such
cases. That said, as a matter of policy, such cases are analogous to the
situation illustrated in Figures 18 and 19. If there is a discontinuous jump
in net burdens, then the allocation of burdens is unconstitutional. As long
as there is no discontinuous jump in the net burdens curve, the measure is
not a taking under the CBP. Again, the solution is political because a majority that finds the burden heavy enough can elect a government that will
reverse course.218
218
Examples of legislation by popularly elected officials that harm all citizens obviously are rare. In
Owen v. Donald, 151 N.W. 331 (Wis. 1915}, the court thought it faced such a case, but failed to realize that
the solution to such a problem is political. In Owen, the court held unconstitutional a tax to establish forest
reserves that would benefit future generations. Although the opinion is difficult to decipher, the grounds for
striking the statute appear to have been special provisions in the Wisconsin Constitution on budgeting and
public improvements. The court went on, however, to suggest that the statute was a taking of property from
the living for the benefit of future generations:
But how to square them [the takings clause] with the imposition of large public burdens upon the
people of the present without any hope of return to them ... burdens imposed with the avowed
purpose of accumulating benefits for generations yet unborn, is somewhat puzzling. The mind
naturally reaches out to grasp some sort of present equivalent moving to the tax payer for the
property taken from him, and, seemingly, closes upon a shadow. There must be some present
benefit. It is not sufficient that the forced contribution will be a boon to some future generation.
The state has no right to take the property of individuals presently and afford them no possible return, merely because the storehouse, being filled, will be opened some time, depending upon

255

HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 255 2002-2003

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Now drop the assumption that the social measure under consideration
simply redistributes wealth. In most cases, one would hope, governmental
actions produce social gains so that the benefits (region A in the figures
above) will exceed the burden (region B). The Court has never interpreted
the Takings Clause to require even rough equality or fairness in the distribution of gains from public projects. The CBP, which is limited to sharp
jumps in burdens, does not rule out any distribution that burdens no one.
As long as the line in the net burdens curve never dips below the horizontal
axis, there cannot be a takings claim.
V. FEES, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS, AND SPECIFIC TAXES

The redistributive legislation just analyzed differs from many statutes
because, in addition to being able to determine burdens, which one assumes
are always identifiable, one could discern the benefits of such legislation
with relative precision. This usually is not possible for the general revenue
taxes discussed so far because governments use income, estate, sales, and
most other tax revenues to fund a broad range of services and goods. Simply put, the benefits cannot be pinpointed in many situations.
For some government taxes, along with special assessments and user
fees, however, one can identify beneficiaries and the size of their gains easily.
It is especially easy in regard to governmental fees for the use of a park, for a
driver's license and plates, or for public garbage collection. In such cases, the
main beneficiary is the fee payer. 219 Special assessments are one step removed from fees. They provide a mechanism to compel all members of a
group benefited by some project, most typically a road, to pay some "fair
share" of the project's cost, like a share based on each owner's frontage. As
with the simple user fee, the class of beneficiaries is easily identifiable when
it comes to special assessments. Compulsion is necessary to avoid freeriding.220 In addition to fees and assessments, this Part considers what will be
called "specific" taxes, meaning those taxes levied to provide a specific benefit to identifiable beneficiaries. Redistributionary taxation is one example of
such "specific" taxation and property taxation to fund schools is another.
The basic question, however, remains unchanged: how does one draw
the line between acceptable fees, special assessments, and specific taxes on
the one hand, and unacceptable variations that concentrate net burdens too
narrowly and, thus, amount to a taking? Again, what distinguishes fees, assessments, and specific taxes from general revenue taxes is the ability to
Providence and the majority as to when, for the enrichment or comfort of the people then in being
in which the tax payer had no special interest which reasonably demands any such sacrifice.
/d. at 366. This strange rule would make even the most popular environmental measures (i.e., ensuring future generations of clean air and clean water) unconstitutional. The court failed to understand that the Takings Clause does not constrain self-imposed burdens.
219
To the extent the "fee" exceeds the government's cost of delivering the service or good, it includes an
implicit tax; presumably, it is used as general revenue and subject to review under the Takings Clause.
220
See ROBERT COOTER& lliOMAS ULEN, LAW &ECONOMICS 42 (3d ed. 2000).
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factor the benefits of the government's expenditures into net burden curves.
As Fried has noted, "[i]t is operationally incoherent to isolate the tax side of
fiscal affairs ... for the simple reason that we can undo any tax distribution
on the transfer side."221 Accounting for benefits as well as burdens is nothing new for takings law; courts have long weighed "reciprocal benefits," as
well as implicit or in-kind compensation, in deciding whether or not an
owner has suffered a taking. 222
Epstein, applying his strict disproportionate burden standard, generally
approves of special assessments because the law governing them requires
some proportionality between the benefit conferred and the assessment imposed.223 Yet, the case law's proportionality requirement is extremely
loose, which gives the state wide leeway in setting the assessments due
from individual property owners. In the early case of Griffin v. Mayor of
Brooklyn, 224 for instance, the plaintiff landowner argued that since regrading a road would benefit some who owned no land along the route, the state
was obligated to pay for the project with proceeds from a general tax. The
court, in rejecting this contention, declared that by matching benefits and
burdens more closely than a general tax, special assessments were not just
legal, but positively desirable. 225 Assessments, the court stated, "shift the
burthen of this taxation upon that part, or class ... whose lands were benefited by the work, and impose[ d] it on them in proportion to the benefit they
respectively received therefrom. " 226 The court held that the assessment
"was obviously made for the purpose of avoiding the injustice of general
taxation for a special local project," and that it exacted "no more than his
just share" from any landowner. 227
The Griffin court also went on to note the fundamental similarity between assessments and user fees:
The same principle of apportionment has been applied to bridges and turnpike roads.
The money paid for their construction and maintenance is reimbursed by means of
tolls. Tolls are delegated taxation; and this taxation is charged and apportioned upon
those only who derive a benefit from the original expenditure, and in proportion to that
benefit. General taxation upon a town or county for the building of a bridge is valid
and lawful, but obviously unjust; because it compels one to pay for the benefit of another. Tolls are more equitable, because they equalize the burthen with the benefit. 228

221
222

Fried, supra note 113, at 182.
Jd.

223

EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 286--89. He does note that if the state funds some type of project by special assessment, it must do so for all such projects, otherwise those localities assessed will disproportionately fund that type of improvement. Id. at 289-90.
224
4N.Y.419(1851).
225
Jd. at 425.
226 Jd.
227 Jd.
228

Jd. at 431.
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Based on this similarity, the court indicated that holding special assessments invalid would also require holding tolls and other user fees invalid.
The court deemed this result absurd, as "[t]he difference is only in the mode
in which each tax-payer's share of the burthen is ascertained."229
The Supreme Court articulated a similar standard in Houck v. Little
River Drainage District:
[W]ith respect to [special assessment] districts thus formed, whether by the
legislature directly or in an appropriate proceeding under its authority, the legislature may itself fix the basis of taxation or assessment, that is, it may define
the apportionment of the burden, and its action cannot be assailed under the
Fourteenth Amendment unless it is palpably arbitrary and a plain
abuse. . . . Unless the exaction is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary character is mere confiscation of particular property, it cannot be maintained that the state has exceeded its taxing power. 230

Another court voiced a similarly adaptive standard:
The burdens of the state never have been, and never can be, distributed with
absolute equality and fairness among the citizens thereof. Some taxes will
bear a very unjust relation to the benefits received, while others will bear a
very fair relation thereto; but this is doubtless owing in a large degree to the
necessary imperfections incident to every system of taxation which has yet
been devised, and all that can be reasonably expected is that the greatest good
of the greatest number will be secured by the system adopted; or, in other
words, that the system shall be as fair and equitable as it can reasonably be
made. 231

The general rule, then, is that even a slight, tenuous correlation between the amount paid in taxes or assessments on the one hand, and the
benefits received on the other hand, is sufficient to shield a measure from a
takings challenge. Under this standard, unsurprisingly, courts generally uphold special assessments, though a few courts have seemed to require a

229
Jd. The Court's economics appear dated, as the decision predates the study of public goods for
which there is no natural (market) measure of costs or benefits. Tolls make sense as a price for (rivalrous)
congested roads, but not for uncongested roads. Thus, although use of public goods is correlated with benefits, the relationship is far from exact. In its defense, the Court was weighing fairness, not efficiency.
In the case of special assessments for projects that increase the value of neighboring property, however,
one may be able to measure the benefit to landowners, because it will be capitalized into the price of the
parcels. Admittedly, this effect will not always be measurable.
230
239 U.S. 254,262,265 (1915) (citations omitted). This deference to the calculation of special assessments originated in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905),
where Justice Holmes approved of assessments that are "generally fair" and that do "as nearly equal justice
as can be expected." /d. at 434. "[I]f a particular case of hardship arises, that hardship must be borne as
one of the imperfections of human things." /d. This case reversed a brief deviation into closer scrutiny of
special assessments under Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898). See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L.
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 744 (2d. ed. 2000).
231
Woodv.Quimby,40A.161,165(R.I.l898).
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somewhat closer matching of benefits with the burden of payment. 232
Courts are particularly likely to invalidate special assessments found to confer no benefit on a property owner billed for some portion of an improvement.233
The weight of classical authority endorsed a similarly flexible standard
for specific taxation. Cooley argued:
There is no imperative requirement that taxation shall be equal. If there was,
the operations of government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossibility of fulfilling it. The most casual attention to the nature and operation of
taxes will put this beyond question. No single tax can be apportioned so as to
be exactly just, and any combination of taxes is likely in individual cases to increase instead of diminishing the inequality. 234

The Wood court listed common taxes for which benefits and burdens
matched up poorly or not at al1. 235 Courts also have noted that school taxes
are due whether or not a taxpayer has children. 236 Likewise, police and fire
taxes have been levied, legally, on those owning no property in a jurisdiction.237 Summarizing the principles underlying such cases, Cooley declared:
it is almost unanimously held that it is no defense to the collection of a tax for
a special purpose that a person liable for the tax is not benefited by the expenditure of the proceeds of the tax or not as much benefited as others. For instance, every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax although he
has no children, or is not a resident, and this also applies to corporations; of a
police or fire tax, although he has no buildings or personal property; or of a
road tax although he never used the road.238

The Supreme Court has concurred with the thrust of such court deci232
See, e.g., McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 379 A.2d 446 (N.J. 1977); Fluckey v. City of Plymouth, 100 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. 1960).
233
Palmer Township Mun. Sewer Auth. v. Witty, 388 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1978) (invalidating assessing on
an owner for two sewer lines).
234
COOLEY, supra note 13, at 164.
235
The court stated :

(I]nstances are numerous in which the individual taxpayer receives and can receive no direct benefit from the public improvement or institution to be paid for and supported by the tax, and yet he is
called upon, and undoubtedly legally called upon, to conbibute towards the expense of erecting
and maintaining the same.

Wood, 40 A. at 164.
236
See Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118,124 (1864) ("[A] person having no children pays an annual
school tax to help educate the children of parents of abundant means."); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194,203 (1905) ("Every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax, though
he have no children ."); Wood, 40 A. at 164 ("A tax for the support of public schools is one from which only
a part of the taxpayers receive any direct benefit ... [because] only a part thereof have children to be educated therein, and some of those who have children prefer to educate them in private schools.").
237
Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 203; Wood, 40 A. 161 (upholding special assessment for firefighting improvements on an owner whose property lied about a half mile from the nearest proposed hydrant).
238
COOLEY, supra note 52, at 214.
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sions, noting that "there are doubtless many individual cases where the
weight of a tax falls unequally upon the owners of the property taxed. This
is almost unavoidable under every system of direct taxation. But the tax is
not rendered illegal by such discrimination."239
Thus, it is commonly understood that the state has broad leeway in
making assessments and levying taxes. Moreover, there is a strong policy
reason for this loose standard. Generally, it is efficient to make it relatively
easy for the government to use special assessments or specific taxes to fund
projects for identifiable groups of beneficiaries. Even a rough correspondence between burdens and benefits will reduce waste and if the program
confers few benefits, those paying for it will usually kill it. If courts required strict correspondence between assessments or specific taxes and
benefits, governments would have incentives to avoid litigation by simply
funding everything out of general revenue taxes.
The CBP implements the minimal requirement that only a loose correspondence need exist between benefit and burdens in special assessments
and specific taxes. To illustrate this point, one only has to apply the CBP to
the ubiquitous use of a real property tax to fund local public schools. For
parents of a dozen school-age children owning or renting a low-value property, the benefits of the tax far exceed the costs. For a childless individual
owning a high-value property, the reverse is true. Between these two extremes there will be a range of cases. In the end, however, the net burden
curve for this tax almost assuredly will be free of any large jumps. Thus,
under the CBP, a property tax used to fund local schools, a tax that is already omnipresent in America, is not a taking. Under a similar argument,
special assessments for roads, irrigation districts, and other projects also
pass muster under the CBP .240
At some point, however, courts have indicated that the state can go too
far. The language from the special assessment cases is especially vivid in
this regard, albeit not very helpful. In Houck, for instance, the Supreme
Court declared an assessment valid "unless it is palpably arbitrary and a
plain abuse. Unless the exaction is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary character is mere confiscation of particular property, it cannot be
maintained that the state has exceeded its taxing power."241 The CBP, on
the other hand, offers a natural and more precise way to define tax burdens
that are "palpably [or flagrantly] arbitrary," "plain abuse," or that amount to
"a mere confiscation of particular property." It is those taxes that impose an
239

Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 203.
Brauneis notes that "in the paradigm case of taxation revenue raising is separate from appropriations-that is, the tax is not earmarked in advance." Robert Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises, Phillips, Money,
and the Limited Role of the Just Compensation Clause in Protecting Property "In Its Larger and Juster
Meaning ", 51 ALA. L. REv. 937,946 (2000). This does not hold for, inter alia, local property taxes "earmarked" for education.
241
Houck v. Little River Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 262 (1915).
240
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assessment or tax rate that is distinctly more burdensome on one or a few
individuals than it is on all others, with no corresponding and roughly offsetting benefit conferred.
VI. PACKAGING AND LOGROLLING
Even under the comparatively small state and national governments of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, citizens paid a variety of general
and specific taxes, assessments, and fees. In return, they received diverse
benefits, directly or indirectly. The number and complexity of both taxes
and benefit programs, however, increased dramatically over the last one
hundred years. The existence of these numerous, and potentially offsetting,
legal regimes raises fundamental and difficult questions: when deciding
whether a citizen has suffered a compensable taking, does one focus on
each statutory, regulatory, or administrative measure separately? Or does
one go to the other extreme and weigh the combined, net effect of all measures on each individual's welfare? Or, finally, does one look at some intermediate "package" of measures that are closely related based on some
relevant criteria?
Traditionally, takings law has focused narrowly on single, discrete issues. Thus, when taking a parcel of land, the state may reduce compensation based on offsetting benefits directly tied to the reason for the taking
(e.g., the new highway will raise the value of an adjacent parcel owned by
the same person), but it may not cite benefits that the landowner reaps from
other governmental programs (e.g., the state cannot cite the benefits Bill
Gates derives from the copyright and patent laws to reduce the compensation due for taking a parcel of land he owns).
In theory it may seem that there is no reason not to throw all benefits and
burdens into one grand equation and require payment of compensation only
to those, after accounting for all benefits and burdens, subject to noticeably
larger net burdens under the CBP. Indeed, experience suggests that many
seemingly unrelated legal measures are the product of political horse-trading.
History provides examples of taxes passed in large part to offset perceived
unfairness in existing exactions. 242 More generally, different interest groups
may engage in "logrolling," which creates two laws that, taken alone, apportion burdens asymmetrically, but when taken together, satisfy the CBP. After
discussing theory and history, however, this Part concludes that, in practical
terms, permitting the government to dilute or reject just compensation claims
by citing other governmental programs, which provide offsetting benefits,
would effectively erase the compensation requirement.

242

For example, one of the main arguments for a progressive federal income tax was that existing tariffs imposed disproportionate burdens on lower income taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 24449. Similarly, a major motivation for state taxes on personalty was the perception that land taxes unfairly
burdened those with relatively little wealth. See infra text accompanying notes 250-52.
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In the abstract, efficient tax theory suggests that the government assess
levies so as to minimize the deadweight loss caused when taxation alters
consumers' decisions. 243 If put into practice, this theory might impose a
large number of narrowly focused taxes on goods without substitutes, such
as the insulin diabetics need. Each such tax, standing alone, imposes
asymmetric, discontinuous burdens in violation of the CBP. Yet, ex ante,
even risk-averse citizens might support this efficient tax regime if (i) the reduction in deadweight loss was significant and (ii) the number and variety
of taxes was high enough that, after accounting for all of them, few or no
citizens were singled out for discontinuously large burdens.
The disconnect between efficient taxation and taxation in practice is so
great, however, that it moots the possibility discussed in the previous paragraph. Logrolling, therefore, has been common in both federal and state
fiscal policy. This Part will briefly examine two sets of paired taxes from
the nineteenth century: tariffs and the income tax at the national level, and
real and personal property taxes at the state level. An 1870s advocate of reinstituting the national income tax nutshelled the regressive nature of traditional taxation in America at both levels: "[I]n the context of federal and
state taxation, the poor and middle classes already paid the most due to the
regressive aspects of the tariff and the heavy burden of land taxes." 244 In
fact, advocates of the income tax and taxes on personalty relied, in large
part, on the unfairness of tariffs and real property taxes to sell the new taxes
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Stanley argues that "the income tax originated as an apology for the
aggressive manipulation of other forms of taxation, especially the tariff,
during the Civil War. It was maintained as a shield against attack upon the
expanding system of protection, whose regressive implications troubled
even its authors."245 Prominent politicians repeatedly highlighted the regressive nature of America's tariffs, which fell "entirely on consumption,"
and a tax on consumption "is a tax upon the poor."246 The tone was caustic:
We tax [via tariffs] the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses.
We tax every little thing that is imported from abroad, together with the whiskey that makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the tobacco that
consoles him. . . . [Y]et we are afraid to touch the income of Mr. Astor. . . . [T]he income tax is the only one that tends to equalize these burdens
between the rich and the poor. 247

Motivated by such views, the federal government's first income taxes,
243

MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE,

supra note 158.
STANLEY, supra note 3, at65 (paraphrasing Rep. Burchard).
245
!d. at 13.
246
!d. at 18 (quoting Sen. Sherman).
247
/d. at 19. Similarly, Senator Trumbull argued ''that a flat rate of taxation on sugar meant that the
poor man paid a much greater proportion of his income in the price than did his wealthy counterpart, and
that 'that is not equal ... it is not according to the property of the individual."' !d. at 34.
244
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imposed during the Civil War, had high exemptions and thus impacted only
the relatively wealthy. Yet, after the War, Charles and Mary Beard sardonically note that "the beneficent government ... crowned its generosity
to capitalists by abolishing the moderate tax on incomes and shifting the entire fiscal burden on goods consumed by the masses. " 248 Populists, in fits
and starts, pushed for reinstitution of a progressive income tax as a counterweight to the ever-present high tariffs on necessities. William Jennings
Bryan argued that it "was fair that the main burden of the income tax fell on
the wealthy, since the tariff, twenty times greater, fell disproportionately on
the working man." 249 Populist efforts finally bore fruit with the passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.
A parallel political struggle over taxation occurred at the state level
during the same period. Exclusive reliance on real property taxes became
increasingly regressive as people held greater proportion of wealth in the
forms of untaxed or ineffectively taxed personalty, such as stocks, bonds,
and other securities; capital assets; patents and copyrights. 250 Judge Cooley,
no radical, argued that "state tax systems ... were in practice unequal and
oppressive because of the prevalence of undervaluation and the failure successfully to tax personalty."25 I Subsequent empirical work has proven Cooley's assessment accurate: "Some 72 percent of state revenues came from
general property taxation as late as 1890, and contemporaries were unanimous in their observation that these taxes failed to reach personal property,
and generally underassessed it when it was included in the laws."252 The
government resolved this inequity only when it defined income to encompass the income from personalty.
Thus, advocates justified the national and state income taxes, in part, as
remedial measures, designed to address regressive burdens imposed by preexisting levies. Opponents of these fiscal innovations realized that one way
to challenge the new taxes was to limit discussion to the new tax in isolation, not as part of a larger context. Accordingly, Stanley has framed the
debate over the first income tax as follows: "[S]upporters [of the Civil War
era income tax] tended to portray the tax as a balance wheel in the context
of a predominantly regressive system, while opponents located inequities in
the income tax law itself."253
Thus, advocates have long understood that a key issue in debating a tax
lies in packaging--determining what levies and outlays should be grouped
248

!d. at 4 (quoting 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

99,105-15 (1949)).
249

WITTE, supra note 89, at 72.
Note that all save the homeless pay real property taxes: owners pay directly, while renters pay indirectly through their landlords.
251
STANLEY, supra note 3, at 83 (quotation omitted).
252
ld. at 81.
253
/d. at 34.
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together for purposes of analyzing the distribution of burdens and benefits.
The possibilities of packaging are literally endless. However, two examples
illustrate the wide scope of packaging arguments possible.
First, there are any number of plausible packaging stories that might be
used to justify progressive taxation. This Article has discussed two already:
the possibility that many publicly provided goods benefit the wealthy disproportionately (packaging benefits from outlays with the progressive income tax) and the use of a progressive income tax as a counterweight to
regressive tariffs (packaging the two taxes together).
Second, consider the example cited by Epstein: depression-era legislation that retroactively gave debtors greater rights in foreclosure. The Supreme Court held that such legislation worked a taking and Epstein
concurs. 254 He argues that such legislation singles out one group, mortgage
lenders, for a material burden, and thus the legislation does seem to violate
the CBP. Although the burden will vary continuously, from mortgagees
with small loans to those with large loans, the effective rate ofthis burden is
similar for all lenders and zero for all others, except debtors, for whom the
legislation bestows a benefit at a rate symmetric with the burden on lenders.
Those that wished to provide depression-era debtors with some relief
could have argued that such measures should have been packaged with the
macroeconomic policy of deflation. Federal monetary policy allowed
prices to fall, yielding a benefit to creditors and a burden to debtors. Considered in tandem with deflation, reforming foreclosure to aid debtors arguably restored some balance to a set of policies that otherwise unfairly
favored creditors.
The bottom line of this section is that if we permit the government to
defeat taking claims by such packaging arguments, the just compensation
requirement must disappear. If the government may cite monetary policy, it
can cite fiscal policy, government contracts, the building of roads, Social
Security, or any of the thousands of other government programs in the next
case. There is no limiting principle for courts to apply in deciding what is
the proper package in deciding takings claims.
254
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 438 n.l2 (citing, inter alia, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (striking down federal bankruptcy statute granting mortgagors, inter alia, five-year
term of possession after default before foreclosure)). Radford's current status is unclear. A recent bankruptcy decision,/n re Yi, 219 B.R. 394 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), stated that it "has been all but overruled by
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank," id. at 401 (citing Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain
Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937)), but Shepards and a close examination suggest that Vinton Branch distinguished Radford. The same bankruptcy opinion also said that Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 401
n.52 (1943), declared that Vinton Branch corrected the "error" of Radford, and the cited footnote does suggest strongly that the Court saw Vinton Branch as correcting "error" in Radford. In re Yi, 219 B.R. at 40 I.
Only three years ago, however, Eastern Enterprises cited Radford with approval. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 534 (1998). One leading constitutional law treatise does not cite either Vinton Branch or Griffiths. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1986) (topic not discussed in portions of the 3d ed. presently available). Another cites Vinton Branch and says that it "modified" Radford.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9 (6th ed. 2000).
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Even if one could decide how to define the relevant package of measures, the CBP highlights further difficulties. In order to satisfy the CBP, the
combined percent burdens must offset each other so that there are no discontinuities. Since the base, which measures burdens or benefits, differs,
we cannot compare rates directly. Instead, we need to filter one measure to
make it comparable with the other. Moreover, different programs generally
line up taxpayers in radically different net burden orders, making it generally impossible to calculate the net impact of the measures when stuck together as a package.
Thus, takings laws' traditional refusal to consider additional burdens or
offsetting benefits, or at least those not closely tied to a given measure,
seems justified, as there is no way for courts to conduct such an inquiry. In
the abstract, there is no reason not to weigh all benefits and burdens; in
practice, however, this is impossible. Administrative measures, regulations,
taxes, and other potential takings must stand or fall on their own.
VII. CONCLUSION

The progressive income tax, standing alone, is not a taking under the
CBP developed in this Article. Given the use of marginal rates that apply to
ranges of income, the percent burdens imposed on taxpayers is assuredly
continuous. This doctrinal principle, combined with the historical record
and the plain language of the relevant constitutional clauses, makes a virtually unassailable case for the constitutionality of progressive taxation.
Conversely, the Bill Gates Tax and other levies of its ilk impose starkly
different percent burdens on only a few taxpayers, as compared with the
next-most-burdened taxpayers. Thus, such taxes violate the CBP. The
CBP, then, achieves the doctrinal challenge described in the introduction: it
provides a standard that justifies progressive taxation in general, yet does
not justify extreme cases like the Gates Tax. The CBP focuses on substantive burdens and when possible, benefits, a focus that is altogether at odds
with the Supreme Court's highly formal "specific asset" grounds for distinguishing taxes and takings in Eastern Enterprises.
There is no reason to limit application of the CBP to the possibility that
taxes are takings. The CBP also offers a concrete and workable definition
of what it means to be singled out for an unfair portion of public burdens.
In fact, the CBP dovetails well with most Supreme Court takings cases and
probatively suggests why other cases are troublesome, like the landmark
designation of Grand Central Station in Penn Central and the complete ban
on sales of eagle feathers in Allard. Thus, the CBP can serve both as a tool
to organize and clarify our understanding of takings law and as an aid to
avoid such missteps in the future.
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